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MARTIN, LAUREEN SANDBORG, Ph.D. Convergent Elaboration: 
Equating the Mnemonic Value of Provided and Generated Words 
and Images. (1990) 
Directed by Dr. Reed Hunt and Dr. Marc Marschark. 191 pp. 
Three incidental-learning procedures tested the 
hypothesis that the picture superiority, imagery, and 
generation effects each depend on the convergence of 
elaboration on the target concept rather than on the extent 
of elaboration. Undergraduates saw pairs of either words or 
pictures, either interacting or adjacent, and either 
verbalized or imaged the relationship between the items. 
It was predicted that for presented relationships, one 
item would become a more effective cue for the other if the 
orienting task directed elaboration to the relationship 
rather than to associations of the separate items. If the 
picture superiority effect reflects the constraining effect 
on elaboration imposed by the more explicit stimuli, this 
effect should be enhanced in paired-associate learning by 
verbalization of the relationship (Experiment 1). If the 
imagery effect reflects the constraining effect on 
elaboration of generating specific perceptual associations 
of generic concepts, relational phrases should benefit more 
than interactive pictures from visualization of the 
relationship (Experiment 2). In both cases, the stimulus-
task combination that directed elaboration to the 
relationship between cue and target was expected to produce 
the higher recall. 
For generated relationships, no recall difference was 
expected between stimulus modalities (Experiments 1, 2, and 
3) nor between orienting tasks (Experiment 3), since 
generation was hypothesized to promote maximum cue-target 
convergence. Since familiar pairings should also promote 
convergent elaboration, likely relationships were expected 
to be more retrievable than unlikely relationships. 
All recall predictions were confirmed (e < .05). 
Recognition of individual items produced the same pattern of 
results as cued recall but at a higher level. That is, a 
task that did not promote convergence on the relationship 
presented was also ineffective in making the items in the 
relationship distinctive. Pearson correlations of recall 
and reported strategy, as well as of imagery vividness 
ratings and recall indicated that differential imaginal 
elaboration did not account for the memory effects. 
The compatibility of the results with dual and amodal 
models of representation and with a processing view of 
semantic memory is discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: ELABORATIVE PROCESSING 
AND MEMORY EFFECTS 
The way in which we organize and access knowledge is a 
topic of intense current controversy. New findings are 
straining the credibility of previously adequate models of 
semantic memory, and new models of limited applicability 
are multiplying to cover the deficiencies. One cause of 
the theoretical ferment is a barrage of recent evidence 
which will be considered in this chapter that elaborating 
verbal material with supplementary information does not 
necessarily increase the probability of its retrieval 
(e.g., Anderson, 1983, p. 199). 
Apparently the traditional principle that the more 
associations of a word are involved in its processing, the 
better it will be remembered can no longer be stated in 
this simple, quantitative form. In fact, there is reason 
to believe that the true relationship between recall and 
the number of associations activated at encoding is an 
inverse function (Nelson, Bajo, & Casanueva, 1985). 
According to the emerging view of elaboration, only 
associations that specifically relate a target concept and 
the contextual information that will serve as a retrieval 
cue are likely to facilitate recall. 
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The research described in this thesis extends this new 
principle, convergent elaboration, from verbal to nonverbal 
processing and applies it to both externally provided and 
internally generated information. The hypothesis tested in 
the research is that regardless of the stimulus mode 
through which a concept is acquired, regardless of whether 
the context for its interpretation is a part of the 
stimulus or is generated from prior knowledge, and 
regardless of whether the product of contextual elaboration 
is verbal or imaginal, effective processing involves not 
more but more cogent associations—the associations that 
will be relevant during a retrieval attempt. 
Chapter I develops the convergent elaboration 
hypothesis by analyzing the correspondences among three 
reliable memory effects. Two of these effects, the 
advantage of pictures over words and of imaginal over 
verbal orienting tasks, are generally thought to exemplify 
the benefits of more extensive elaboration. The third 
effect, better memory for internally generated words than 
for externally provided ones, has been explained in several 
ways. Even though some of these explanations assume that 
more associations are involved in generating words than in 
reading or hearing the words of others, most agree that 
subjective generation results in a more distinctive trace— 
a qualitative view of memory enhancement. 
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The fact that this view is inconsistent with the 
quantitative account of elaboration offered for the 
mnemonic advantage of pictorial stimuli or an imaginal task 
has not been explored, probably because the investigation 
of verbal effects and of nonverbal effects has largely been 
the province of competing models of representation. Yet a 
comparison of the conditions that produce consistent memory 
effects in either paradigm suggests that it is more 
restricted, not more extensive, elaboration that enhances 
retrieval in every case. 
Chapter II describes three experiments comparing the 
mnemonic effectiveness of provided and generated words and 
images. These experiments demonstrate that the usual 
advantage of pictures, of imagery, and of generation can 
each be eliminated by manipulations affecting the quality 
of elaboration. Their results support the conclusion that 
there is no intrinsic difference in mnemonic value between 
stimulus modes providing differing amounts of perceptual 
detail nor between experimenter-provided and subject-
generated elaboration. Nor does it seem to matter whether 
the elaboration is induced verbally or visually. The only 
variable found to predict relative recall consistently was 
the mutual specificity of retrieval cue and target concept. 
Chapter III discusses the implications of convergent 
elaboration for the nature of semantic representation. In 
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developing a unified explanation of effects usually 
separately assigned to either modality-dependent or amodal 
storage, it suggests a way of reconciling the two models. 
Elaborative Processing 
Extensive Elaboration 
Both common sense and personal experience confirm the 
usefulness to memory of making new experiences as richly 
meaningful as possible, of elaborating them with old 
knowledge; it is a truism of popular wisdom as well as 
instructional practice. Until recently, the assumption of 
a causal relationship between the amount of semantic 
elaboration and the probability of retention has permeated 
cognitive psychology as well, and many of its theorists are 
still disposed to treat this relationship as a phenomenon 
to be explained rather than as an hypothesis to be tested. 
A frequent explanation of the advantage of semantic 
elaboration has been that it increases the number of 
associations involved in the processing of a concept and 
that this increase in associative involvement increases the 
number of routes by which the concept may later be accessed 
(e.g., Anderson & Reder, 1979? Craik & Tulving, 1975). 
That is, even while demonstrating the fallacy of the once 
widely accepted principle that all learning is a positive 
function of such quantitative external events as 
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repetition, rehearsal, and reinforcement, cognitive 
psychology has tended to endorse an equally quantitative 
account of internal events. 
Even theorists who differ on the question of whether 
associative representation is amodal and abstract or 
involves separate systems for verbal and nonverbal storage 
have concurred on the value of more extensive elaboration. 
For example, advocates of bimodal storage propose two 
quantitative explanations for the greater memorability of 
concrete than of abstract words: (1) concepts with distinct 
perceptual referents are represented in a spatial mode, a 
form naturally more associatively complex than a 
sequentially organized verbal representation, and (2) 
whereas both concrete and abstract concepts have verbal 
representation, concrete concepts are more likely to be 
represented in the spatial mode as well (Paivio, 1971, 
p. 220). Paivio, whose dual coding theory has been the 
most influential version of this modality-based account of 
representation, hypothesizes that both the picture-
superioritv effect—better memory for the picture of a 
concept than for its label—and the imagery effect— 
better memory for a word when a particular referent is 
« considered—demonstrate that accessing a word's nonverbal 
representation during encoding increases its later 
availability by promoting redundant storage (Paivio, 1971, 
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pp. 179, 391? 1986). 
The elaboration stressed by amodal accounts of 
semantic memory differs from that of bimodal accounts in 
positing entirely abstract knowledge structures? it tends 
to be equally quantitative. Although Anderson himself 
documented the sometimes detrimental effect on memory of 
elaboration, refering to this effect as "irrelevant fan" 
(e.g., Anderson, 1983, p. 199), his network model has 
contributed to the popular equation of the spread of 
activation with its effectiveness. He, too, has at times 
seemed to equate the value of elaboration with its 
quantity, as in his unqualified statements that "memory for 
a piece of information can be improved by manipulations 
that increase the amount of elaboration performed," 
"elaborations facilitate recall by providing additional 
retrieval paths" (1980, p. 192), and "the most critical 
determinant of retention is the number of elaborations" 
(Anderson & Reder, 1979, p. 390). 
The influence of this view of elaboration is apparent 
among other well known proponents of amodal processing. 
Craik and Tulving (1975), for example, attributed the 
improved noun recall they obtained with an increase in the 
complexity of sentence contexts to the amount of 
associative elaboration the noun concepts received, which 
they assumed to be greater when the contextual information 
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provided was richer. Greater elaboration was also invoked 
by Lockhart, Craik, and Jacoby (1976) as the reason that 
less familiar or more complex text was better recalled than 
was easier material. 
This quantitative hypothesis remains strong in much 
recent discussion of memory effects. Eysenck (1979) 
applied it to word lists, arguing that the recall advantage 
for lists consisting of semantically related items results 
from an increase in the elaboration of encoding. McDaniel 
(1984) applied it to stories, attributing the superior 
recall of idea units composed of words with missing letters 
to increased total elaboration. The assumption that more 
is better often emerges even when the reference to 
elaboration is not explicit. For example, Kolers (1975) 
cited "extensiveness of processing" to explain the improved 
memorability of sentences presented in an inverted 
orientation, and "amount of processing" was offered by 
Johnson-Laird, Gibbs, and de Mowbray (1978) as a sufficient 
reason for the higher recall of words that were positive 
instances in a category judgment task. 
With such a variety of findings showing an advantage 
for associatively elaborated over nonelaborated concepts, 
it was heuristically useful to attribute the advantage to 
elaboration per se. Regardless of their position on the 
representation of verbal and nonverbal knowledge, many 
8 
cognitive psychologists considered the higher recall of the 
more concrete or more conceptually related items, as well 
as of items that were evaluated more thoroughly and those 
that were comprehended less readily, to be evidence of the -
advantage of associative embellishment. Lately, however, 
some findings have emerged which require a reassessment of 
the link between elaborating and remembering. 
Convergent Elaboration 
In 1972, Craik and Lockhart proposed that the 
retention of verbal material depends on the "depth" of 
processing, with semantic elaboration preferable to equally 
extensive processing focused on such superficial aspects of 
words as their phonology and spelling. Although considered 
a qualitative alternative to the view that retention 
depends on the extent of elaborative rehearsal, the depth-
of-processing hypothesis was also quantitative in its 
assumption that each "level" of encoding corresponds to an 
absolute mnemonic value, without reference to retrieval 
goals. Nevertheless, the idea that it is the kind of 
processing that matters, not its amount, stimulated a great 
deal of research on verbal memory effects, and while 
disconfirming encoding depth as an explanation (Eysenck, 
1979; Hunt & Mitchell, 1978; Stein, 1978), some of the 
findings that emerged challenged quantitative accounts of 
memory effects in general. 
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A number of investigators observed a positive 
correlation between memory and the difficulty of the 
orienting task (e.g., Kolers, 1975; Tyler, Hertel, 
McCallum, & Ellis, 1979), a result seeming to justify the 
equating of elaboration and distinctiveness. Others, 
however, found no such correlation. In fact, when the 
processing actually allocated to a task was measured by a 
decrement in the performance of a concurrent task, the 
items processed more extensively (or intensively) often 
proved to be no more memorable than those encoded more 
automatically (Mitchell & Hunt, 1989). 
Jacoby and Craik's (1979) demonstration that memory is 
enhanced by both a more difficult encoding task and a 
retrieval situation that is more relevant to that task was 
another step away from an absolutist, quantitative view of 
the benefits of elaboration. When the recall of target 
words was cued by words with which they had been associated 
by a relational decision, the result was higher recall than 
recognition scores. Jacoby and Craik concluded that memory 
for an item depends on its discriminability from other 
items at retrieval rather on the extent to which it was 
elaborated or the semantic depth to which it was processed. 
A resolution of the confusion about elaboration and 
memory was proposed by Stein, who reasoned that the 
processing evoked by contextual information—that is, 
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automatic elaborative processing—can promote recall of a 
target term only to the extent that it clarifies the 
significance of this term (Stein, 1978? Stein & Bransford, 
1979; Stein, Morris, & Bransford, 1978). In other words, 
it might be the precision with which a concept was defined, 
not the extent to which it was embellished, that determined 
its retrievability. 
This premise implies that semantic elaboration may 
reduce as well as facilitate recall. Stein supported his 
argument with a number of demonstrations that contextual 
information is useful only if it clarifies the relationship 
between a target word and the concept that will later serve 
as its retrieval cue. He found that unless specifically 
relevant to the target, information that increases the 
complexity or distinctiveness of its context is relatively 
ineffective in promoting recall. Recall of the word tall 
was no better when it was presented in an elaborated 
sentence, "The tall man purchased the crackers that were on 
sale," than in its base form, "The tall man purchased the 
crackers." Elaboration served retrieval of the target only 
when it was relevant to tallness: "The tall man purchased 
the crackers that were on the top shelf." (Stein & 
Bransford, 1979? Stein, Brock, Ballard, & Vye, 1987? Stein, 
Littlefield, Bransford, & Persampieri, 1984? Stein, Morris, 
& Bransford, 1978) 
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As formulated by Stein, the principle of precise 
elaboration pertains exclusively to verbal material. Its 
relevance to nonverbal contextual elaboration or to 
nonverbal or verbal generated elaboration is unclear. 
Nevertheless, the demonstration of the importance of the 
precision of descriptive elaboration for the recall of 
coherent language suggests that convergent processing may 
be crucial for the retrieval of other everyday experiences. 
Two steps are involved in extending the concept of 
convergence from words to nonverbal stimuli and from verbal 
to nonverbal processing. The first is to specify the 
conditions under which elaboration converges on a target 
response. A theoretical justification is needed for the 
counterintuitive claim that less associative processing 
occurs in viewing pictures, imagining objects, or 
generating words than in simply comprehending isolated 
words. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to this 
analysis. The second step is empirical—to support the 
hypothesis that regardless of whether stimulus modality or 
orienting task imposes the constraint during encoding, its 
influence on the retrieval process is the same. This 
support is provided in Chapter II. 
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Memory Effects 
Among the uncertainties of memory research, three 
effects are predictable in a variety of processing 
conditions. Study after study supports the conclusions 
that (1) pictures are more memorable than words, (2) words 
are more memorable when their referents are imagined, and 
(3) one's own words are more memorable than those of 
others. Since picture superiority and imagery effects are 
generally attributed specifically to visual processing, 
they have been studied primarily by proponents of dual 
representation. The third effect, the generation effect, 
although not a necessary consequence of amodal 
representation, has been of interest primarily to 
proponents of propositional models or to those who were not 
committed to a particular model of long-term memory. 
Dual-coding theory, despite its emphasis on the value 
of image production, does not predict a general advantage 
for subjective generation (i.e., Paivio, 1986). The 
propositional models, despite their concern with the 
associative organization of memory, have given little 
empirical attention to the probability that the greater 
part of knowledge concerns visually acquired spatial 
associations. As a result, quite different paradigms have 
been used in studying the three effects, and the 
relationship between generating and imaging remains 
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unresolved. There are nevertheless similarities across 
paradigms in the conditions that enhance or depress 
retrieval. These similarities become more evident when the 
effects are characterized in terms of processing rather 
than of stimuli or tasks. 
The Picture Superiority Effect 
The typical manifestation of the picture superiority 
effect occurs in studies comparing memory for object 
concepts presented either as pictures as as nouns (e.g., 
Jenkins, Neale, & Deno, 1967; Madigan, McCabe, & Itatani, 
1972? Paivio & Csapo, 1973; Paivio & Yarmey, 1966; Sampson, 
1970). The basic observation that only pictures provide 
explicit information about the physical features of objects 
may suggest that this perceptual information is directly 
registered in an imaginal form. Thus the picture 
superiority effect is customarily assumed to be the result 
of the differential access of pictorial and verbal stimuli 
to imaginal processing. According to dual coding, it is 
also more likely that a picture will evoke a label than 
that a noun will evoke an image, and therefore the picture 
is more likely than the word to be registered in two forms 
(Paivio, 1971, p. 179; Paivio, Rogers, & Smythe, 1968). 
The same observation, however, could as validly lead 
to the speculation that it is the specificity with which an 
item is defined in an associative system that determines 
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its memorability. A generic label might promote 
elaboration that is extensive and imprecise, whereas the 
perceptual information provided by a picture might 
constrain and direct elaboration, resulting in more 
definite traces. Even when supposedly conveying a generic 
concept, a picture might restrict processing to a subset of 
potential associations of the concept; a single word, even 
a subordinate term, would impose no comparable 
restrictions. 
Studies comparing pictures and one-word labels thus 
confound stimulus mode and information value. Even the 
undistinguished outline drawings commonly used in learning 
studies convey a context for the object depicted, the 
features that individualize it. A word, however, is only a 
feature of the verbal or perceptual context in which it 
occurs and is itself defined by this context. A 
decontextualized word could therefore evoke only relatively 
diffuse associative processing. In general, the more 
contexts in which it was habitually used, the less the 
processing it evoked should converge on a pattern 
exclusively associated with a particular interpretation. 
So without a defining context to direct processing, word 
comprehension would be only approximate, and the attenuated 
traces of this processing would be relatively ineffective 
in directing retrieval. 
15 
But if it is the specificity of the information 
conveyed by pictures and not the perceivability of this 
information that accounts for the picture superiority 
effect, then verbally presented information that defined an 
item as specifically as does a picture should promote 
equivalent recall. This speculation would suggest that 
either a picture advantage or a word advantage might be 
obtained by manipulations that affected the specificity 
with which elaboration converged on a relationship between 
the cue and target items. 
In fact, although the well documented ascending 
sequence of mnemonic effectiveness from abstract nouns to 
concrete nouns to pictures to physical objects (Paivio, 
1971) suggests that for any two sets of stimuli, the more 
concrete will be the more readily learned, this formula 
does not always work. When items must be retained in the 
order of presentation, concrete nouns may be recalled no 
better than abstract nouns (Brener, 1940) and pictures may 
be recalled no better than their concrete labels (Paivio & 
Csapo, 1969; Paivio, Yuille, & Rogers, 1969). Apparently, 
knowledge of the perceptual features of particular items is 
irrelevant to this learning task. In other words, when 
retrieval depends on relational knowledge, such as the 
order of successive items, elaboration directed to item-
specific information may be misdirected. 
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But even when retrieval does depend on knowledge about 
particular items, explicit perceptual information may not 
be helpful. If memorability were simply a function of 
concreteness, one would expect realistic, detailed 
pictures to be more comprehensible and memorable than more 
stylized representations. Yet diagrammatic drawings can be 
better th&n accurate illustrations for teaching complex 
concepts (Alesandrini, 1984). The pictures used to 
demonstrate the picture superiority effect are often quite 
abstract outline drawings. Such stimuli typically produce 
a ceiling effect in recognition and verbal recall 
(Kobayashi, 1985), so apparently they are not less 
effective than more concrete materials such as photographs 
or three-dimensional objects. 
Furthermore, if the mnemonic superiority of pictures 
results from the elaborative processing they promote, then 
the more aspects of a picture are considered, the more 
memorable it should become. Yet adults who had judged 
photographs of faces on such traits as dependability 
(judgments presumably requiring attention to multiple 
features) recognized the faces no better than did others 
who had judged them on the presence of a single distinctive 
feature (Winograd, 1981). The functional equivalence of 
the two judgment tasks implies that the same principle may 
have operated in both conditions. That is, pictures may be 
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well remembered because their sensory richness promotes 
focused, distinctive elaboration, or, in Winograd's words, 
"the chances of a unique encoding increase as one encodes 
more features" (p. 185). 
These observations suggest that the presentation of 
information in a pictorial form facilitates learning not 
because this information is concrete but because it is 
usually salient to a target concept. They also suggest 
that the picture superiority effect is only a shifting 
point on a continuum of memory effects that exemplify the 
value of appropriately directed processing and that have 
little to do with concreteness per se. 
The Imagery Effect 
Words are better recalled if subjects are advised to 
form a visual image of the named object than if they are 
either told to rehearse the words or given no strategy 
instructions (e.g., Paivio & Yuille, 1969). This well 
established effect has been widely accepted as prima facie 
evidence for the dual coding hypothesis that the image of a 
verbal referent is stored in a form distinct from the 
verbal code, providing an alternative route to the concept 
and doubling the probability of its retrieval. The 
troublesome issue that is not resolved by this explanation 
is the validity of the comparisons by which the imagery 
effect is demonstrated. In the standard comparison of 
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verbal and imaginal orienting tasks, just as in the 
comparison of pictures and their one-word labels, 
information value is a confounding factor. 
In demonstrating an imagery effect, processing 
directed toward the perceptual features of a particular 
instance of a concept is compared with the undirected 
processing of a generic concept. Without an attempt to 
instantiate the generic term through imagery, the 
associations it evokes may be inchoate, disorganized, and 
inconsistent. There may or may not be more elaborative 
involvement in imagining an instance of an object concept 
than in considering its meaning in relation to other 
concepts, but the knowledge accessed with the former 
strategy is certainly more specific. The relative 
ineffectiveness of the processing with which intentional 
image formation is usually compared may therefore be due to 
its imprecision and not to its verbal nature. If so, then 
verbal elaboration that is comparable to imaginal 
elaboration in its specificity should promote comparable 
memory. 
An entirely unequivocal test of this possibility may 
not be feasible, since any verbal elaboration that made an 
item more specific would probably disambiguate its 
appearance and so intensify the conscious experience of 
imagery. However, the role of appropriate elaboration 
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might be approached indirectly by demonstrating that the 
mnemonic value of imagery instructions varies as a function 
of the degree to which the imaginal task integrates cue and 
target items as a relational concept. 
The proponents of dual coding attribute the improved 
probability of recalling a word when its referent is 
purposefully imagined to the superiority of two codes over 
one. Nevertheless, another dual-coding tenet, that the 
comprehension of a concrete word usually involves the 
spontaneous activation of an image, although with a lag of 
a second or more (Paivio, 1971, p. 76), suggests that a 
conscious strategy of image formation is either redundant 
or futile, depending on the time available. Along with its 
corollary, that recognition of a pictured object involves 
the spontaneous and immediate activation of its label, this 
tenet implies that the value of either generated or 
provided images results not from the dual coding they 
engender, since this duality is automatic, but from the 
quality of processing entailed by perceptual-imaginal 
elaboration. 
It does not follow, however, that memory for pictures 
as well as for words would be improved by imaginal 
elaboration. A pictorial symbol may, as dual coding theory 
claims, tend to activate a predictable generic label. Even 
so, the processing of perceptual information specific to 
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the instance depicted may conflict with the accessing of 
dominant associations of the label that are not apparent in 
the picture. Therefore the attempt to elaborate the 
concept imaginally, which would depend on the strong 
convergence of this concurrent activation on subjective 
associations, might fail. Therefore pictures may be 
inferior to words as stimuli for intentional imagery. 
One significant step toward dissociating imagery and 
conceptual specificity has been made in the study of the 
mnemonic advantage of concrete to abstract words, an effect 
dual-coding theorists consider a clear manifestation of the 
advantage of spontaneous imaginal elaboration (e.g., 
Paivio, 1971, p. 85). The context-availability hypothesis 
explains the concreteness advantage as the result of a 
preference for using concrete terms in most ordinary 
circumstances, making a context for interpretation more 
available in associative memory for concrete than for 
abstract words (Johnson, Bransford, Nyberg, & Cleary, 1972; 
Kieras, 1978; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983; Wattenmaker & 
Shoben, 1987). By turning the focus in the concreteness 
effect from the "visibility" of dominant associations to 
their semantic relevance, the context-availability 
hypothesis not only offers a testable alternative to the 
dual-coding account of memory for verbal stimuli but also 
suggests the amenability of other imagery-related phenomena 
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to amodal analysis. 
A context-availability resolution accords with the 
analysis of memory effects proposed in this paper insofar 
as it rejects imagery as an explanation and considers 
differential retrieval in terms of the integration of 
polysemous words in an associatively organized system. 
However, it differs from the view of elaboration that is 
proposed here in defining the availability of a particular 
context in terms of the number of contexts potentially 
available. One problem with the context-availability 
equation of memorability and variety of meanings is that it 
fails to explain an undisputed correlate of concreteness— 
reported imagery value (e.g., Paivio, 1971, p. 79). If a 
greater number of contexts for interpretation causes the 
concreteness effect, one would hardly expect the more 
concrete words to evoke the more vivid images, a phenomenon 
which seems to indicate the dominance of a specific 
interpretation. It would seem more valid to conclude that 
a single context becomes more available as concepts become 
more concrete because there are fewer competing contexts. 
The Generation Effect 
A typical generation paradigm compares memory for 
words that have been wholly or partially self-generated in 
response to verbal associations with memory for the same 
words when they have been explicitly presented. The usual 
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finding is that a word is more memorable if it was self-
generated than if it was read or heard (e.g., McFarland, 
Frey, & Rhodes, 1980? Slamecka & Graf, 1978). 
The generation effect seems particularly compatible 
with a propositional network model of representation, since 
with a semantically organized system, a word that comes to 
mind in response to a relational rule and a specific word 
cue is of necessity already linked to that cue. It is 
unlikely that the linkage would be as close with an 
externally provided word. Therefore a generated response 
would be more likely than a provided response to be 
reaccessed during a retrieval attempt prompted by the 
original encoding cue (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983; Slamecka 
& Graf, 1978). 
In contrast to effects which clearly involve imagery, 
the generation effect does not necessarily suggest the 
operation of differential semantic elaboration. Yet 
quantitative principles have frequently been invoked to 
explain the effect. Some researchers have explicitly 
equated the generation effect with the extent of 
elaborative processing (e.g., Craik and Tulving, 1975; 
Johnson-Laird et al., 1978; Kolers, 1975). Other 
proposals—number of operations (McFarland, Frey, & Rhodes, 
1980), cognitive effort (Tyler et al., 1979), semantic 
depth (Jacoby, 1978)—implicitly base the effect in the 
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extent of lexical involvement. 
However, the consensus seems to be that generating a 
word produces a more distinctive encoding than does reading 
it (e.g, Jacoby, 1978; Jacoby, Craik, & Begg, 1979? 
Schmidt, 1987). Although the process by which 
distinctiveness is achieved remains vague, it clearly 
pertains to the quality, not the quantity, of processing. 
Some suggestions are that a generated term profits from its 
integration with prior knowledge and that generation 
increases the strength of the cue-response or context-item 
relationship—interpretations consistent with the idea of 
convergent elaboration (Graf, 1980; Greenwald & Johnson, 
1989; Nairne & Widner, 1987; Pressley, McDaniel, Turnure, 
Wood, & Ahmad, 1987; Rabinowitz & Craik, 1986). 
When situations which do not produce a generation 
effect are considered, the convergence explanation of 
retrieval failure is clearly applicable. Whether or not 
there is a mnemonic advantage for material that a subject 
has helped to produce seems to depend on two factors: the 
semantic relationship of the generated to the provided 
material and the relevance of this relationship at the time 
of recall. The generation effect occurs for meaningful but 
not for meaningless nonwords and for familiar but not 
unfamiliar or infrequent nouns pairs (Gardiner and Hampton, 
1985; McElroy & Slamecka, 1982; Nairne, Pusen, & Widner, 
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1985). Furthermore, the superiority of generated to read 
words is manifested only when recall is cued by the 
stimulus words or when stimulus-response word pairs are to 
be recognized, not in tests of free recall or recognition 
of only the response words (Graf, 1980). Considered 
together, these findings indicate that generation does not 
exert its effect on the response term alone but on the 
semantic relationship between this term and the stimulus 
which evoked it during both the initial generation and the 
later regeneration. In other words, subjective generation 
may well promote recall by promoting the convergence of 
semantic processing on the cue-target relationship. 
This explanation is supported by Stein and Bransford's 
(1979) demonstration that the mnemonic efficacy of 
generated elaboration depends on its relevance to the 
target concept. Subjects who produced continuations of 
base sentences about a man described with various target 
adjectives showed enhanced recall of the adjective when 
cued by their own elaborated sentence frame only if the 
continuation clarified the significance of this attribute. 
Those who produced continuations that simply made the 
situation more specific recalled less than subjects for 
whom target-relevant continuations had been provided, even 
though the generated elaborations were undeniably 
personally relevant. 
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Organization Effects 
The superiority of semantically related stimuli to the 
same stimuli presented as unrelated items is ubiquitous in 
memory research. It occurs in comparisions between 
associated and nonassociated pairs of words, between 
coherent sentences and randomly combined words, between 
paragraphs with sentences in a logical sequence and 
paragraphs with sentences randomly ordered, etc. 
The proponents of dual coding theory attribute these 
effects to the cohesion that a stored compound image 
provides between discrete verbal elements (Begg, 1983; 
Bower, 1970). A cohesive image may be constructed as a 
deliberate strategy to link unrelated items; it may also be 
spontaneously evoked by semantically related items. 
Paired-associate learning is better if subjects are advised 
to form an image of the two items in interaction than if 
they are told only to form images of them (Bower, 1970). 
Furthermore, a cohesive image may be perceptually 
provided: pictured objects are more memorable if depicted 
as interacting than if shown side by side (Epstein, Rock, & 
Zuckerman, 1960). 
Like dual coding theory, the propositional models 
explain the power of relational processing in terms of the 
cohesion it establishes between otherwise separate 
elements, but they describe this cohesion as conceptual, 
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not imaginal. According to a propositional account, 
relating concepts in a comprehensible way improves the odds 
of their being recalled as a unit by strengthening their 
linkage in an associatively organized system (Anderson, 
1983). 
The ubiquity of organization effects suggests a 
unifying principle behind the perceptual and verbal memory 
effects under consideration: relational processing 
improves memory by unifying the component concepts—that 
is, by restricting their meaning to the associations 
consistent with the relational concept. Organization 
effects may thus be considered general manifestations of 
the reductive form of elaboration hypothesized to underlie 
each of the effects considered in this paper. The 
elaboration provided by pictures is more definitive than 
the elaboration evoked by labels, and the elaboration that 
is intentionally generated, whether verbalized or imaged, 
is more definitive than the elaboration that is externally 
provided. In other words, elaboration that converges on a 
coherent relationship seems to be more effective than more 
inclusive or more arbitrary elaboration. 
27 
Promoting Convergence Through 
Generated Elaboration 
Imagery as Generation 
Most of the demonstrations that have been described as 
generation effects have dealt with verbal stimuli and 
verbal production only. The assumption behind this 
restriction on research has seemed to be that since the 
activation of nonverbal knowledge is not directly 
observable, it does not qualify as generation. 
Nevertheless, the benefits of generation have been shown 
not to depend on overt responding. Slamecka and Fevreiski 
(1983) have demonstrated a retrieval advantage, relative to 
words that were read, for the same words when they were 
sought during a generation attempt but not produced or even 
consciously accessed. Thus the unobservability of imaginal 
processing should not exempt it from consideration as 
generation. 
The widely held idea that thinking which produces 
images is analogous to visual perceptions, involving the 
parallel processing of spatially organized associations, 
whereas thinking that produces words involves strictly 
serial associative processes, might be considered a major 
deterrent to the equating of visual and verbal generation. 
A promising answer to this objection has been proposed by 
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Marschark, Richman, Yuille, and Hunt (1987), who point out 
the necessity of distinguishing between on-line, modality-
specific processes and the organized knowledge that is 
output by, and input to, these processes. More than one 
product might be constructed from amodal knowledge 
configurations, just as the same palette may be used to 
create an impressionistic landscape or a formal geometric 
composition, depending on the intentions of the artist. 
Furthermore, the distinction between parallel and serial 
processes is far from clear, since they apparently occur 
simultaneously during all semantic processing and seem to 
indicate only relative hemispheric tendencies rather than 
distinct processing modalities (Marschark & Surian, 1989). 
Other findings suggest more directly that the mnemonic 
effects of generating images and of generating words 
reflect a single function. The visual task analogous to 
remembering experimenter-provided text is remembering 
experimenter-provided pictures. Yet despite the supposed 
power of the picture superiority effect, the intentional 
generation of images can make reading a better learning 
method than viewing pictures (Rasco, Tennyson, & Boutwell, 
1975). It therefore seems resonable to attribute the 
imagery effect not to the pictorial qualities of images but 
to the process of generating them. 
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To describe imagery as a form of generation is not to 
explain its mnemonic benefits. In fact, simply indicating 
the similarity of verbal and nonverbal effects does not 
advance the understanding of either form of generation. 
Nor does it explain the relationship between the 
constructive imagery evoked by words and the retained 
images of visual perceptions. To integrate these seemingly 
disparate external and internal events in an orderly 
system, some factor common to the processing of each is 
needed. This commonality is convergent elaboration. 
Convergent Elaboration Predictions 
The reasoning outlined in the preceding pages implies 
that memory depends on the convergence of elaboration 
during the initial encoding and again during a retrieval 
attempt. The convergence of the activation that occurs in 
response to an initiating event on specific associations 
would determine the conceptual integration of the event. 
In the case of words, the fewer the dominant meanings, the 
more concentrated would be the activation and the stronger 
its traces. In the case of pictures, the more specific the 
depiction to the target concept, the more likely would 
activation be to converge on the target label. 
During cued recall (and it can be argued that 
retrieval is always cued, externally or internally), 
activation which occurs in response to an element of the 
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original event would converge to some degree on the 
previous pattern. That is, the effectiveness of a cue 
would depend on the extent to which it had previously been 
exclusively associated with the target. The convergent 
elaboration of cue and target might result from their 
mutual salience in numerous past experiences (semantic 
convergence) or it might occur during a single cogent 
experience (episodic convergence). Recognition memory 
could be considered a special case of cued recall, one in 
which the retrieval cue is especially apt to reactivate the 
target traces. 
Although this account assumes automatic spreading 
activation, it does not suppose that all meanings of a word 
are eguipotential. An interpretation might be temporarily 
primed by an externally or internally established 
associative bias, or a more stable hierarchy of probable 
meanings might direct processing in the absence of an 
explicit context. If the dominant associations of a word 
were visual, activation might converge on an instantiation, 
experienced as a visual image. 
The picture superiority effect is also explicable in 
terms of convergent elaboration. A picture of a concept 
would induce very constrained processing because of its 
distinctive perceptual features. By contrast, a verbal 
label for the concept could have many possible 
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instantiations and would activate a corresponding breadth 
of associations. So unless a defining context were either 
provided or generated, the processing it induced would be 
diffuse and therefore unmemorable. 
If the foregoing analysis is valid, the three effects 
under consideration all indicate the advantage of 
convergent elaboration. Accordingly, it should be 
possible, either by imposing more constraint on elaboration 
in the normally inferior condition, or by inducing 
irrelevant elaboration in the normally superior condition, 
to nullify this advantage. Furthermore, it should not 
matter whether the elaboration is evoked by objective 
stimulus features, as in the Stein and the Nelson studies, 
or by subjective intentions. With the appropriate biasing 
of elaborative processing, pairwise comparisons of 
conditions that usually indicate an absolute superiority 
for pictures, imagery, or generation should reveal the 
relativity of these effects. 
The three experiments reported in Chapter II ask 
whether the picture superiority effect can be eliminated 
through verbal generation and whether imaginal and verbal 
generation can be equally effective in promoting retrieval. 
The thesis proposed in this paper—that picture and imagery 
effects depend on the relative convergence of processing on 
the relationship between a potential cue and target— 
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suggests the cases in which these effects should be 
vulnerable. These cases would compare the mnemonic 
effectiveness of experimenter-provided and subject-
generated relational elaboration. In general, the 
following processing conditions should affect associative 
activation and memory performance in the following ways: 
(1) In a comparison of stimulus modes with a task 
directing attention to the cue-target relationship, the 
mode providing the more explicit information on the 
relationship should promote the more convergent 
elaboration, producing a picture superiority effect 
(Experiment 1). 
(2) In a comparison of stimulus modes with a task not 
directing attention to the cue-target relationship, the 
mode requiring the more explicit subjective elaboration 
should promote the more convergent elaboration, eliminating 
the picture superiority effect (Experiment 2). 
(3) In a comparison of orienting tasks, the task 
requiring subjective elaboration of a cue-target 
relationship not explicit in the stimuli should promote the 
more convergent elaboration, producing imagery or 
generation effects (Experiments 1 and 2). 
(4) In a comparison of stimuli, the form combining 
the more dominant cue-target associations should promote 
the more convergent elaboration, producing a familiarity 
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effect (Experiments 1, 2, and 3). 
(5) In a comparison of forms of elaboration 
hypothesized to have comparable effects on convergence, 
apparent picture superiority and generation effects 
should be reduced or eliminated (Experiment 3). 
A convergence account would also welcome evidence that 
the relevance to memory of an imaginal strategy depends 
jointly on task demands and stimulus characteristics— 
i.e., the finding that more (or less) imagery is reported 
with an imaginal than with a verbal task, or that vividness 
ratings are higher (or lower) with pictures than with 
words, but that these differences do not necessarily 
correlate with recall. Such findings would help to confirm 
the nonfunctional nature of the imagery experience. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENTS: EQUATING THE MNEMONIC VALUE OF WORDS 
AND PICTURES THROUGH GENERATED ELABORATION 
Three experiments were performed to consider the 
interaction of stimulus mode (verbal or pictorial) and 
processing orientation (verbal or imaginal) in determining 
the effectiveness of retrieval cues. Recall was compared 
with predictions based on an advantage for more extensive 
semantic elaboration and with predictions based on an 
advantage for elaboration that converged on the 
relationship between the target concept and the recall cue. 
One potential result of these comparisons would have 
supported the dual-coding premise of an advantage for 
pictures that are labeled or words that are imaged. 
Another result would have suggested that imagery also 
accounts for the generation effect. Either of these 
outcomes would have confirmed the value of more extensive 
elaboration of the stimuli. The pattern of results that 
occurred suggests that this quantitative account is 
incorrect and that pictorial presentation, deliberate 
imagery, and verbal generation are simply alternative means 
of increasing the precision with which elaboration 
converges on a target response. 
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Experiment 1: Equating the Mnemonic Value of Words 
and Pictures Through Generated Verbal Elaboration 
The first experiment asked two questions. The first 
was whether promoting convergent elaboration by means of a 
verbal task could make words as memorable as pictures—that 
is, could appropriate elaboration eliminate the picture 
superiority effect? The second question was whether 
promoting convergent elaboration by means of a verbal task 
could make provided information as memorable as generated 
information—that is, could appropriate elaboration 
eliminate the generation effect? 
An incidental learning procedure was used to focus 
attention on the orienting task. The task was to construct 
and produce, by speaking into a tape recorder, a sentence 
in which two objects are related by a preposition. The 
objects were shown as either pictures or their labels, and 
the prepositional relationship was either provided by the 
stimuli or generated by the subject. Since the efficacy of 
either element of a pair in later cuing the other depends 
on the establishment of a concept that relates them, this 
procedure allows the mnemonic value of verbally generated 
concepts and verbally or pictorially provided concepts to 
be compared. 
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Experiment i Predictions 
The principles of extensive elaboration and convergent 
elaboration imply two distinct patterns of recall (see 
Table 1). As explained in the sections which follow, a 
more precise ordering of recall scores might have been 
predicted on the basis of these principles. However, the 
two-value (high vs. low) patterns shown are sufficient to 
differentiate the hypotheses tested and have the advantage 
of being more consistent, more conservative, and far more 
clear than a four-value set of predictions. 
SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: Pics Words Pics Words 
Extensive Elaboration High Low High Low 
Convergent Elaboration High Low High High 
Table 1. Extensive elaboration and convergent elaboration 
recall predictions for pictures and words in provided and 
generated relationships with verbal orienting task. 
Extensive Elaboration Predictions 
Since pictures are more informative than words, they 
are customarily assumed to be processed more extensively 
than the corresponding verbal labels. It is appropriate to 
invoke Paivio's dual coding theory in considering the 
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relative elaboration of words and picture pairs, since it 
is acknowledged to be the most complete model of the 
processes underlying the picture superiority effect. 
Nevertheless, it should be understood that some of the 
comparisons made in this study—e.g., between the 
Pictures, Provided, and the Pictures, Generated, 
conditions—have not been addressed by dual coding and that 
therefore some of the predictions made in this experiment 
and those that follow are extrapolations from the theory 
and not explicit aspects of it. 
According to dual coding theory, pictures are directly 
registered in an imaginal form, whereas the imaginal coding 
of words is indirect and less certain. Assuming that the 
task of putting a complex concept into words would be 
particularly apt to discourage this indirect imaginal 
coding, it is reasonable to expect a lower incidence of 
dual coding with words than with pictures. It is also 
consistent with the theory that the dual-coding advantage 
for pictures should occur whether or not the relationship 
to be verbalized is explicitly provided; two pictures 
should be more conducive than two nouns to the formation of 
an interactive image because they convey specific 
information about the constituent objects. Therefore, as 
indicated in Table 1, the extensive elaboration predictions 
are consistent with a picture superiority effect for both 
interactive and separate stimuli. 
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Strategy usage should corroborate this outcome: not 
only should more reliance on imagery be reported in the 
picture than in the word conditions but a positive 
correlation between recall and imagery usage should occur 
in all conditions. 
The dual coding tenet that the memorability of a 
concept is determined by the number of modalities 
participating in its processing permits the prediction of 
relative retrieval only within each source-of-relationship 
condition. It does not permit the prediction of any 
specific interaction between stimulus modality and degree 
of subjective generation. Whatever the effect of verbal 
generation—if it improved the recall of pictures and words 
to the same extent, if it benefited pictures more than 
words, or if it benefited words more than pictures—dual 
coding could attribute the effect to an enhancement of 
either mediational-imaginal or verbal-associative 
processing. 
To do so, however, it would have to argue that such 
processing was less likely or less effective in one case 
than in the other. Since dual coding considers pictures 
intrinsically imageable, words should be the primary 
beneficiaries of generated mediational imagery. Therefore, 
if a generation effect occurred for words, a higher 
correlation between reported imagery and recall might be 
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expected for words in the generated than in the provided 
condition. The corollary of this outcome might be 
predicted if a generation effect occurred for pictures: 
Even though a sentence-production task ensures verbal 
processing of the object names and their relationship in 
all conditions, pictures should be particularly apt to 
benefit from an increase in verbal elaboration due to 
generation of the relationship. Therefore a higher 
correlation between reported verbal processing and recall 
might be expected for pictures in the generated than in the 
provided condition. 
Convergent Elaboration Predictions 
As a comparison of the patterns in Table 1 reveals, 
each replicates that of the other mnemonic principle in 
three of the four stimulus conditions. A convergent 
elaboration pattern is distinguished from an extensive 
elaboration pattern only by the prediction of high recall 
in the Words, Generated, condition. That is, only one low-
recall condition was predicted on the basis of the 
convergence of elaboration. In comparison with the 
unsuitability of the provided phrases together with the 
sentence-production task for promoting convergent 
elaboration, the other stimulus-task combinations seemed 
relatively suitable. 
Presumably, associations of both constituent concepts 
are implicated in the processing of a relationship between 
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them. Subjective orientation as well as stimulus features 
influence this processing, and either factor may direct 
processing to associations that specify the relationship. 
In the Words, Provided, condition neither factor provides 
this constraint. A noun-preposition-noun phrase conveys 
minimal information about the interaction between two 
objects, whereas a great deal of knowledge about the 
objects as separate entities and in other relationships is 
latent in memory. The orienting task of Experiment 1 
requires only that the syntactic role of the three words be 
replicated in a prescribed sentence frame. Thus, even 
though the phrase expresses a relational concept, there is 
no impetus, external or internal, for the semantic 
elaboration of relational particulars—perceptual, 
functional, or situational. It was therefore predicted 
that the Words, Provided, condition would not promote 
convergence on relational associations, so that the power 
of either label to later access the relational concept 
would be weak. 
One means of directing the automatic elaboration of 
each object concept to associations specific to their 
relationship would be to generate this relationship. When 
a relationship which must be verbalized is not provided, 
the associations of both objects that are compatible with a 
permissible relationship would have to be processed more 
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intensively than are features of the objects that are 
irrelevant to an interaction between them because it is 
only on the basis of this subset of associations that a 
choice of prepositions could be made. The traces of this 
convergent elaboration, reactivated when either component 
occurred as a cue, would facilitate retrieval of the other. 
It was thought that the facilitation might be stronger for 
two nouns than for two pictures because the pictures would 
impose perceptual elaboration irrelevant to that involved 
in generating a relational concept. If so, the two word 
conditions would produce the extreme scores on the recall 
scale: highest when the relationship was generated, lowest 
when it was provided. With the simple line drawings used 
in this study, however, it seemed as likely that the 
divergent influence of any irrelevant perceptual detail 
would be offset by the relational specificity imposed by 
the verbal task, so that pictures would be nearly as 
effective as words as stimuli for generation. Therefore 
moderately high recall was predicted for the Pictures, 
Generated, condition. 
Convergence of elaboration ranked the two picture 
conditions indeterminate in their relation to each other. 
Although only two stimulus conditions involve the 
conceptual generation of a relationship, verbalizing the 
relationship conveyed by a picture should focus processing 
on the relational concept in the same way as would 
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generation of the concept and should have the same effect 
on memory. There seemed no reason, therefore, to expect a 
generation effect for pictures. The only other clear 
expectation about the pictorial stimuli was that the 
specificity of either separate or interactive pictures 
would constrain processing more than would the 
nonspecificity of three-word phrases—i.e., a picture 
superiority effect was predicted for the provided 
relationships. 
Another implication of a convergence view of 
associative activation is that one element of a pair is 
more apt to be an effective cue for the other when the 
relationship between them is familiar than when it is 
arbitrary. Functional and perceptual associations formed 
in a single episode might not be cohesive enough to 
override competing associations to the cue. However, an 
episode that evoked an already established relational 
concept should strengthen associations between the cue and 
that concept. Therefore a second prediction of elaborative 
convergence was that familiar relationships should be 
better recalled than unfamiliar relationships. Because of 
the long association of mnemonic imagery and bizarreness, 
and because more generation presumably occurs in expressing 
a novel concept than in expressing a familiar one, this 
predicted familiarity effect is not necessitated by either 
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an imagery or a generation account. 
One final prediction of elaborative convergence was 
that the expected pattern of recall would not occur in 
recognition. Cued recall depends on the elaboration of a 
concept relating cue and target; recognition depends on 
elaboration of just the target concept. Since this concept 
was both provided and named in all conditions, it was 
thought that it should be recognized equally well in all 
conditions. This prediction does not differentiate the 
three processing principles, since it is not inconsistent 
with the mnemonic value of either imagery or verbal 
generation. However, it is confirmatory only for a 
convergence view, since high recognition in a condition 
that produced low cued recall would indicate that the low 
recall was not attributable to incomplete processing of the 
target itself but to incomplete convergence of this 
processing on those associations of the target that relate 
it to the cue. Equivalent recognition between stimulus 
conditions would also confirm that the necessity of 
producing a label in cued recall did not penalize those for 
whom the original presentation had been pictorial. 
Summary of Experiment 1 Predictions 
Cue-target pairs were shown in one of four stimulus 
conditions: as concrete nouns, either adjacent or 
connected by an interactive preposition, or as pictures, 
either adjacent or interactive. The orienting task was the 
44 
same in all conditions, to verbalize a (or the) 
relationship between the items in a complete sentence. 
Because of the hypothesis that cued recall depends on 
the joint efficacy of stimulus and task in promoting the 
convergence of elaboration on the cue-target relationship, 
the pattern of results was expected to disconfirm 
predictions based on an absolute advantage for either 
pictorial stimuli or verbal generation. Contrary to 
the picture superiority effect, high recall was predicted 
for words as well as for pictures when a relationship 
between cue and target items was generated; contrary to the 
generation effect, high recall was predicted for pictures 
in provided as well as in generated relationships. The 
convergence principle also implied that recall would be 
higher for likely than for unlikely relationships in all 
conditions. A further prediction was that reported 
strategy usage would not support an imagery-effect 
interpretation of the results. 
Experiment 1 Method 
Design 
There were five factors of two levels each: Source of 
Relationship (Provided or Generated), Stimulus Mode 
(Pictures or Words), List, and Gender were between-subjects 
factors; Likelihood of Relationship (Likely or Unlikely) 
was a within-subjects factor. The eight between-subjects 
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conditions were factorially combined: 40 subjects saw 
picture pairs and 40 saw word pairs; the relationship 
between each pair was presented to 20 subjects in each 
Stimulus Mode condition and generated by 20; 10 subjects in 
each of these cells saw a stimulus set completely different 
from that shown to the other 10; and women and men were 
equally represented in every cell. 
Subi ects 
Eighty students of introductory psychology received 
course credit for their participation. Five men and five 
women were arbitrarily assigned to each condition. All 
participants were right-handed. (Preliminary scaling of 
the stimuli had been done the previous semester by 108 
undergraduates from the same course.) 
Materials 
Stimuli. In a preliminary study, 42 pairs of concrete 
nouns linked by the preposition "in" or "on" had been rated 
on a seven-point scale for "the likelihood of the 
occurrence of the relationship." The likely and unlikely 
pairs derived from these ratings were each divided into two 
sets equated on mean likelihood, then the four sets were 
combined to produce two lists consisting of ten likely and 
ten unlikely pairings. The remaining two pairs, plus two 
unrated pairs, were designated as training stimuli. 
Four versions of each list were constructed: separate 
pictures, separate words, interactive pictures, and 
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interactive words. It should be noted that even in the 
likely set the two objects were not highly associated. For 
example, the relationships "thermos in vest" and "kitten on 
package" were among those rated most likely. (A copy of 
the likelihood rating form is shown in Appendix A. Lists 1 
and 2, with the mean likelihood rating of each 
prepositional relationship, are shown in Appendix B.) 
The pictures, black-and-white line drawings of common 
objects, were taken from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test booklet (Dunn, 1959). The picture pairs were arranged 
either in a comprehensible interaction (a lamp on the back 
of a turtle) or in the same orientation as in the 
interactive set but side by side (a lamp beside a turtle). 
The corresponding word pairs, printed in lower-case 
letters, were separated either by the preposition "in" or 
"on," depending on the corresponding picture (lamp on 
turtle), or by a dash (lamp — turtle). 
The eight stimulus sets were videotaped for 
presentation on a 16x25-inch screen. The thickness and 
sharpness of the lines were comparable for verbal and 
pictorial stimuli, and their overall dimensions were 
approximately the same. (Examples of separate and 
interactive pictures and words are shown in Appendix C.) 
Strategy report form. The strategy report form was 
designed to assess the extent to which, regardless of the 
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instructions they received and their intention to comply 
with them, subjects were aware of using imagery during the 
sentence-production task. The sheet containing eight 
strategy statements pertaining to possible combinations of 
imaginal, verbal, and relational processing—e.g., "I 
visualized each of the two objects" (imaginal)? "I thought 
of the names of the two objects" (verbal)? "I visualized 
/ 
the interaction between the objects" (imaginal-relational). 
A copy of the strategy report form, along with the 
instructions given on its use, is shown in Appendix F.) 
Cued-recall forms. The items presented on the left of 
the screen (the agents of the relationship) served as cues 
for recall of the items presented on the right (the objects 
of the relationship). These 20 cues were presented as a 
list of either words or pictures, according to the 
acquisition mode. Although the list order was randomized, 
the cues to Likely and Unlikely relationships appeared in 
separate columns to facilitate scoring. All subjects in 
each Mode-List condition were given the same form. 
(Appendix G contains copies of the four cued-recall forms.) 
Recognition forms. In addition to the 20 target 
words (the objects of the relationship) for the relevant 
list, the recognition form contained the 20 targets from 
the other list plus 40 nouns semantically related to the 
targets. (Appendix H shows the recognition form.) 
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Procedure 
The students were tested individually, seated at a 
table facing a video monitor and a tape recorder 6 ft away. 
Instructions. Participants were told that the study 
concerned the effect that speaking might have on the 
ability to think about things that are easy to name. 
The task was the same in all conditions—to wait until the 
stimulus pair disappeared from the screen, then to describe 
aloud a relationship between the objects in a sentence of 
the form "The X is in/on the X* (A sign reminding the 
student of this sentence frame was posted at eye level 
below the video monitor.) In the Provided conditions this 
relationship was apparent in the phrase or picture 
presented. In the Generated conditions, the item shown on 
the left was always the agent of the relationship, but the 
preposition was chosen by the speaker. (Instructions for 
the Provided and Generated conditions of Experiment 1, with 
variations in wording for the two Stimulus Mode conditions, 
are in Appendix D.) 
Training. Four training stimuli were shown while the 
subject practiced producing appropriate sentences. These 
stimuli consisted of two familiar and two unfamiliar 
pairings and, in the Relationship-Provided conditions, of 
both "in" and "on" relationships. The same training sets 
were used in both List conditions. In order to accustom 
the subject to the time constraints of the procedure, the 
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four trials were presented without interruption. After 
giving the subject any further instructions or 
encouragement required, the experimenter started the tape 
recorder, dimmed the lights, left the room, and used a 
remote-control switch to start the presentation. 
Acquisition. The stimuli occurred at a 12-sec rate: 
a stimulus pair remained on the screen for 4 sec; then the 
screen was blank but illuminated for 6 sec, during which 
time the subject stated the relationship between the 
items in six words, using the sentence frame "The (name of 
the item on the left) is (in/on) the (name of the item on 
the right).11 A row of asterisks appeared across the screen 
for 2 sec before the onset of the next stimulus pair. 
There were several reasons for this rather deliberate rate: 
(1) to encourage relaxed, "natural" processing, 
(2) to promote elaboration of the stimuli in terms of the 
response options, and (3) to obviate any tendancy to 
respond while the stimuli were still visible, thereby 
ensuring that remembering was necessary to perform the 
sentence-production task, even in the case of Words, 
Provided, which would otherwise have been essentially a 
reading-aloud condition, and (4) to provide ample time for 
completion of the spoken sentence (the correctness of which 
was the ostensible variable of interest). 
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Although the overt performance was equivalent for 
everyone, for half the subjects the relationship they 
described was provided. Half of these subjects saw 
noun-preposition-noun phrases, the others saw the 
corresponding interactive pictures. The other subjects saw 
either the noun or the picture pairs side-by-side and 
decided on the preposition. So those who saw the phrase 
"kitten on package" would produce the same sentence as 
those who saw the picture of a striped kitten sitting on a 
gift-wrapped package: "The kitten is on the package." 
Those who saw either the two nouns or the two pictures 
side-by-side might say either "The kitten is on the 
package" or "The kitten is in the package." 
Strategy reporting. After stopping the videotape and 
turning off the tape recorder, the experimenter told the 
student that the real purpose of the study was to compare 
the kinds of thinking that occurred with various kinds of 
stimuli. In order to forestall any experimenter demand 
effect, the experimenter emphasized that any, or any 
combination, of the thought processes described might have 
occurred during the preceding task that none was more 
effective than another. Passive terms were used in 
referring to the conscious experience to indicate that the 
process was not considered under the control of the 
individual. It was also stressed that the study was 
concerned with differences among groups, not individuals. 
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After this explanation, the student was given a form for 
reporting the strategies used in the sentence-production 
task, (These instructions, plus a copy of the strategy 
report form, are in Appendix F.) 
The student was told to write a number from 0 to 100 
before each of the eight statements on the form to report 
the percentage of the time this form of thinking had 
occurred—i.e, the sum of the numbers had to be 100. To 
encourage the serious engagement of each participant in 
this introspective exercise, the experimenter urged him or 
her to take as much time as necessary. To avoid disrupting 
the student*s concentration (since the testing room was 
small), the experimenter remained out of the room while he 
or she was doing the strategy-reporting task (as well as 
during the subsequent retrieval tests). After 5 min, the 
experimenter returned to ask the student to check that the 
percentages totaled 100. After 2 min more, the 
experimenter again returned and removed the strategy form. 
All participants completed the form within 7 min. 
Retention testing. Immediately after completing the 
strategy report, the student was surprised with a cued 
recall test. The time between the acquisition and recall 
stages of the procedure was approximately 11 min. The cues 
for recall of the other member of each pair were the agents 
of the relationship, a list of either pictures or words, 
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according to the original presentation mode. The 
experimenter told the subject that he or she would have 
five minutes to write after every cue the name of the 
object with which it had been associated in the first task, 
guessing if necessary, then left the room. 
After 5 min the experimenter returned briefly to again 
urge that a noun be written after each item on the list, 
asking that two more minutes be devoted to remembering 
these objects. After 2 min the cued-recall form was 
removed and the 80-word recognition test was given. 
The student was told that the names of all 20 of the 
objects he or she had been trying to remember were on the 
list and was asked to check just these 20 words. The 
experimenter again left the room, returning after 5 min to 
remind the student to count the checkmarks to be certain 
there were exactly 20 and offering more time for the task, 
if necessary. Nobody needed more than 7 min to complete 
the recognition test. After removing the recognition form, 
the experimenter explained the purpose of the research and 
ended the session by obtaining the participant's agreement 
not to discuss the procedure with other students. 
Scoring 
In this and subsequent experiments, a second scorer 
blind to predictions verified the experimenter's recall, 
recognition, and strategy scoring. The two scorers 
resolved the few discrepancies that were found by mutual 
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agreement. Occasionally, the name by which a subject had 
referred to a pictured object differed from the 
corresponding word stimulus. For example, the "package" 
was sometimes called a "present" or a "box." In such 
cases, the name used by the subject was considered the 
correct response on the cued-recall form. These low-
frequency responses did not s6em to impair performance on 
the recognition test. Almost invariably, the designated 
target response was chosen by those who had produced a 
synonymous term at acquisition. 
Experiment 1 Results 
Retention 
The alpha level for rejection of the null hypothesis 
was .05 in this and in the other experiments reported. 
Preliminary ANOVA's on the recall, recognition, and 
strategy scores of subjects in each of the 32 cells 
revealed no differences due to Gender nor to List, so these 
data are pooled in the reported results. 
Cued recall. For every between-group F ratio, 
MSe (1,76) = 485.9. Although an over-all picture advantage 
(Pictures, 66.1%; Words, 50.1%) produced a decided effect 
for Stimulus Mode (F = 21.1), and although a generation 
advantage (Provided, 46.0%; Generated, 70.3%) produced an 
even more potent effect for Source of Relationship 
(F = 48.4), the result that makes these standard results 
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comprehensible is the Mode x Source interaction (F = 47.4). 
As Table 2 shows, the source of this interaction was 
the inferior recall of noun pairs in predetermined 
relationships (inferior to all other combinations by 40 
percentage points). The significance of this disparity, as 
well as of other deviations from the effects predicted by 
imagery and generation principles, was confirmed by one-
tailed, a priori t tests. Although the usual picture 
superiority effect occurred when relationships were 
Provided [Pictures, 66.0%; Words, 26.0%; t (18) = 5.7], 
words were at least as effective as pictures when 
relationships were Generated (Pictures, 66.2%; Words, 
74.2%). Although the usual generation effect occurred with 
Words (Provided, 26.0%; Generated, 74.2%; t = 6.9), verbal 
generation provided no advantage for Pictures (Provided, 
66.0%; Generated, 66.2%). In other words, recall was high 
for targets related to their cues by a generated 
preposition, regardless of the stimulus mode, and for 
targets presented as pictures, regardless of the source of 
the relationship, in accordance with the convergence 
predictions in Table 1. 
The within-subject factor Likelihood of Relationship 
(Likely, 63.8%; Unlikely, 52.5%) had a strong influence [F 
(1,76) = 26.7, MSe = 189.8], and Likelihood did not 
interact with Stimulus Mode or Source of Relationship. 
However, the recall advantage for the more plausible 
55 
SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: Pics Words Pics Words 
n: (20) (20) (20) (20) 
CUED RECALL: 66 26 66 74 
Likely 70 30 76 80 
Unlikely 62 23 57 69 
RECOGNITION: 92 69 92 92 
Likely 92 70 93 94 
Unlikely 92 67 90 91 
Table 2. Percentage recall and recognition of pictures and 
words in provided and generated likely and unlikely 
relationships with verbal orienting task (Exp. 1). 
relationships was even greater when the relationship was 
Generated [Likely, 77.8%; Unlikely, 62.8%; t (38) = 3.04] 
than when it was Provided (Likely, 49.8%; Unlikely, 42.3%). 
As the breakdown of scores in Table 2 shows, this 
facilitation was especially evident when pictures were the 
stimuli for generation. For Pictures, Generated, the 
likelihood effect appeared as a difference of 18.5 
percentage points [Likely, 75.5%; Unlikely, 57.0%; t (18) = 
3.00]; for Words, Generated, the difference was 11.5 
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percentage points (Likely, 80.0%; Unlikely, 68.5%; 
£ = 1.87). 
Recognition. The recognition results essentially 
replicated the recall pattern, although at a higher level. 
For every recognition F ratio, MSe (1,76) = 176.0. Even 
though the recognition list consisted of words only, the 
advantage for processing based on pictorial stimuli was 
maintained. Stimulus Mode produced a decided main effect 
(Pictures, 91.5%; Words, 80.4%; F = 28.1). The effect of 
Source of Relationship was equally evident (Provided, 
80.0%; Generated, 91.9%; F = 32.0). The Mode x Source 
interaction was also maintained (F = 32.0), and as can be 
seen in Table 2, it was again the Words, Provided, 
condition which produced the outlying data. Only 68.5% of 
the nouns originally presented in phrases were recognized, 
23 percentage points lower than the mean scores for the 
other conditions [t (18) = 5.5], which clustered in the 
narrow range of 91.5% to 92.3%. 
Besides increasing the general level of performance 
from 58.1% to 85.9% (F = 375.8, MSe = 82.3), the 
recognition results differed from those of cued recall in 
one clear way: they showed no advantage for Likely over 
Unlikely relationships. As the breakdown of recognition 
scores in Table 2 shows, the familiarity of the context in 
which the targets had been processed did not affect the 
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ability to recognize them. 
Reported Strategies 
Table 3 shows the reported usage of eight possible 
strategies. As the distribution and general smallness of 
these percentages suggest, the students were not in 
agreement on the best description of their thought 
processes in any stimulus condition. Nevertheless, certain 
tendencies emerged. In the high-recall, Generated 
conditions, the only strategies that received scores above 
20% were the Imaginal-Relational (IHR) mixed strategy 
(Pictures, 26.0%; Words, 39.3%) and the Imaginal-Verbal-
Relational (I-V-Rl combination (Pictures, 23.1%; 
Words, 25.3%). In the equally high-recall Pictures, 
Provided, condition, the high-scoring strategies were 
Verbal (V), 26.3%; Verbal-Relational (V-R). 21.4%; and 
I-V-R. 20.8%. There was even less agreement among students 
in the low-recall Words, Provided, condition, in which the 
top ratings were given to V, 19.6%; I-R. 16.2%; Imaginal 
(I), 15.8%; and Imaginal-Verbal (I-V). 14.2%. 
Although these data seem to present a serious problem 
for the contention that the picture superiority and 
generation effects obtained depend on imagery, the value of 
imagery, or of any conscious strategy, cannot be discounted 
without consideration of the correlation between its usage 
and recall. Table 3 also shows these correlations 
(Pearson's r coefficients). With df = 18, the critical 
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SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: 
n: 
Pics 
(20) 
Words 
(20) 
Pics 
(20) 
Words 
(20) 
CUED RECALL: 66 26 66 74 
IMAGINAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
4 
.31 
16 
.19 
12 
-.05 
17 
.12 
IMAGINAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
10 
.06 
16 
.50** 
26 
-.39* 
39 
-.21 
VERBAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
26 
.01 
20 
-.31 
14 
-.30 
1 
-.04 
VERBAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
21 
.03 
10 
-.04 
9 
.18 
2 
.02 
IMAGINAL-VERBAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
16 
.17 
14 
-.27 
8 
.14 
12 
.05 
IMAGINAL-VERBAL-RELATIONAL 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
• 
21 
.24 
10 
.16 
23 
.20 
25 
.06 
RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
1 
.02 
12 
.04 
6 
.01 
1 
.01 
NONE: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
8 
.02 
2 
-.43* 
2 
.20 
2 
.14 
Table 3. Percentage reported usage of eight strategies 
with verbal orienting task, and correlation of strategy 
usage with recall (Exp. 1) 
* = £ c .05; ** = E < *01 
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value for the planned one-tailed test of positive 
correlation is .378; however, since some negative 
correlations were as strong as the positive ones, the two-
tailed critical value of .444 might be considered 
appropriate. The correlation between I and recall was 
nonsignificant in all conditions by either criterion. In 
fact, the only significant positive correlation (.495) 
/ 
occurred for IR with Words, Provided, in which only 16% 
usage of this strategy was reported, suggesting that if 
interactive imagery had been used, it would have helped. 
Because the participants surely differed not only in 
their retrospective assessment of conscious experience but 
in their interpretation of the strategy statements, 
requiring them to make judgments about eight separate 
strategies may have increased the within-condition 
variability and obscured underlying between-condition 
similarities or differences. In order to clarify any such 
underlying regularities, each subject's percentages were 
re-scored in terms of three basic strategies: Imaginal, 
Verbal, and Relational (I, V, and R). Of the eight 
strategies described on the strategy report form 
(Appendix F), four involve imagery (1, 2, 5, and 6), four 
involve implicit verbalization (3, 4, 5, and 6), and four 
involve relational processing (2, 4, 6, and 8). Thus if 
more than one version of a basic strategy were reported, 
the sum of a subject's scores might exceed 100. For 
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example, the strategies of a subject who reported 50% for 
statement 1 ("I visualized each of the two objects"), 
25% for statement 2 ("I visualized the interaction between 
the objects"), and 25% for statement 3 ("I thought of the 
names of the two objects) would receive the following 
scores: X# 75%; V, 25%; R, 25%. 
The mean percentages shown in Table 4 therefore 
indicate relative, not exclusive, reliance on each of the 
three basic strategies. Although the numeric overlap in 
percentage usage among these strategies precludes their 
being statistically compared, it is valid to compare the 
usage of a given strategy for each stimulus condition. The 
within-groups error term for the following t tests is 
MSe (2,152) = 891.9. 
The highest incidence of I (94.0%) was reported by the 
Words, Generated, subjects, significantly higher 
[t (18) = 5.7] than that of the Words, Provided, subjects 
(56.1%). The Pictures, Generated, subjects also reported 
significantly more I (69.3%) than did the Words, Provided, 
subjects (t = 2.0). These values thus suggest an overall 
correspondence between imagery and generation [I, Provided, 
53.5%; I, Generated, 81.6%; t (38) = 4.5]. They do not 
reflect performance on either memory test, which showed a 
generation effect for Words only. 
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SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: Pics Words Pics Words 
n: (20) (20) (20) (20) 
CUED RECALL: 66 26 66 74 
IMAGINAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 51 56 69 94 
Usage-Recall r .01 .26 .04 .07 
VERBAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 83 54 55 41 
Usage-Recall r -.17 -.33 .19 .08 
RELATIONAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 52 48 64 67 
Usage-Recall r -.36 .34 .10 -.18 
Table 4. Percentage reported usage of three basic 
strategies for pictures and words in provided and generated 
relationships with verbal orienting task, and correlation 
of strategy usage with recall (Exp. 1). 
A connection between imagery and retrieval is even 
less apparent in the other percentages in Table 4. Despite 
equally high levels of recall in the two Generated groups, 
they reported quite different I [Pictures, Generated, 
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69.3%; Words, Generated, 94.0%; £ (18) = 3.7). 
Furthermore, the Pictures, Provided, subjects, for whom 
recall was high, reported no more I (50.6%) than did the 
Words, Provided, subjects (56.1%), for whom recall was 
abysmal. 
Pearson tests of correlation between strategy scores 
and recall confirmed the inadequacy of an imagery-based 
account of the effects obtained. As indicated in Table 4, 
I Usage-Recall correlations were nil in all three high-
recall conditions and weak (r = .256) in the Words, 
Provided, condition. 
The most reliance on V was reported by the Pictures, 
Provided, subjects (83.0%), significantly higher [t (18) = 
4.3] than that of the unfortunate Words, Provided, subjects 
(54.2%). However, the latter percentage was no lower than 
the V reported in either of the high-recall Generation 
conditions (Pictures, 54.6%; Words, 40.5%). In fact, less 
V was reported with verbal stimuli when verbal generation 
was required than when all key words were provided 
(Words, Provided, 54.2%; Words, Generated, 40.5%; t = 2.1). 
In any case, the low or negative V Usage-Recall 
correlations shown in Table 4 indicate that verbalization 
did not benefit memory for either pictures or words. The 
only strategy usage pattern that even approximated the 
pattern of recall occurred for R. Except with relational 
phrases, however, even R did not predict recall. The R 
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Usage-Recall correlation for Words, Provided (.341) was the 
strongest positive correlation in the data, and the only 
one that approached significance. 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
Memory 
Subjects were required to state relationships between 
pairs of objects for which perceptual information did or 
did not appear and for which the relationships were or were 
not specified. Later, a surprise test of recall of one 
member of the pair was cued by the other. The main 
question of interest was whether the pattern of recall 
would be more consistent with the hypothesized advantage 
for convergent elaboration or with one of the alternative 
views considered. Figure 1 summarizes the recall data 
presented in Table 2 and provides graphic reminders of the 
type of stimuli that produced these data. 
If the mnemonic value of an event depends on the 
amount of detail specified by the stimulus, pictures should 
have produced better retrieval than their labels. This 
result occurred when the stimuli provided a relationship 
but not when a relationship between the two items was 
generated. If the generation of elaboration is more 
important than elaboration per se, better retrieval should 
have occurred when a mediator between the items was 
generated than when it was provided. This result occurred 
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Generated 
66 
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26 
Provided 
Words Pictures 
Figure 1. Percentage recall of pictures and words in 
provided and generated relationships with verbal orienting 
task (Exp. 1). 
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for words but not for pictures. As a comparison of the 
results in Table 2 (or Figure 1) with the predictions in 
Table 1 reveals, the pattern of recall obtained is 
consistent with convergent elaboration. 
A second issue addressed by Experiment 1 was the 
mnemonic value of plausibility. Better recall for items in 
likely relationships would be compatible with any 
associative model of representation, including dual coding. 
However, only a convergence account of processing requires 
a "likelihood effect" in cued recall because the processing 
of established associations is necessarily more convergent 
than is the processing of novel provided ones. Although 
the likely pairs did have a recall advantage in all 
conditions, the advantage was significant only for 
generated relationships. Apparently the disadvantage for 
unlikely pairs was greater when a relationship between the 
items was generated than when it was provided, perhaps 
because the search for a conceivable relationship is wider 
when few associations are shared by cue and target than 
when more associations overlap, whereas associative 
strength has less influence on elaboration when it is 
driven by a provided relationship. 
Since the associative overlap between cue and target 
items is maximal when the retrieval cues are the targets 
themselves, elaborative convergence predicted no difference 
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between likely and unlikely relationships with a 
recognition test. This prediction was also confirmed. 
Despite the confirmation of elaborative convergence 
predictions by the over-all pattern of cued recall, the 
interpretation of this pattern is complicated by the 
unexpectedly low recognition scores for nouns which had 
occurred in phrases. Although poor recognition in a 
condition that produced poor cued recall is not 
inconsistent with a convergence model, it could indicate 
that the reason for the poor recall was not just 
insufficient relational convergence but insufficient 
elaboration of any kind. However, perhaps the relatively 
unconstrained elaboration predicted by the convergence 
principle for the combination of verbally provided 
relationships and a verbal production task reduced the 
memorabilty of the object concepts themselves as well as 
the concept of their relationship. If so, then it should 
be possible to raise both cued recall and recognition of 
nouns in provided relationships with a different orienting 
task. This possibility was tested in Experiment 2. 
Strategies 
The validity of conclusions based on introspection is 
of course suspect, and the case for convergent elaboration 
does not depend on subjective reports. Nevertheless, the 
fact that a correlation between the imagery value of 
stimuli and their recall has been verified in numerous 
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studies must be addressed by any alternative explanation of 
imagery effects. Strategy usage percentages were therefore 
collected as supplementary evidence for or against the 
convergence hypothesis. Since introspection is the 
necessary base on which claims for the mnemonic value of 
conscious imagery ultimately rest, a demonstration that the 
amount of imagery experienced in considering a concept and 
the extent to which the concept is recalled can vary 
independently would suggest that stimulus imageability is 
not a complete answer. 
The strategy reports provide little evidence for an 
imagery-based account of memory effects. In particular, 
the common assumption that the conceptual processing of 
pictures preserves their perceptual quality, making the 
picture superiority effect quintessentially an imagery 
effect, received scant support. Although participants who 
were shown pictures certainly averred that imagery 
accompanied their transformation of these stimuli into 
sentences, they reported other forms of elaboration as 
equally prevalent, and they reported even less imagery than 
did participants given verbal stimuli. 
Possibly the conscious component of evaluating object 
concepts and preparing a response was not experienced as 
. \ 
"visualizing objects" to as great an extent when the 
stimuli were pictures as when they were words. This 
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interpretation, although salvaging an imagery 
interpretation of the memory effects found in Experiment 1# 
would seem to necessitate a re-evaluation of the prevalent 
assumption that the "images" evoked by words, although 
weaker than the "images" processed during visual 
perception, are phenomenologically very like them (e.g., 
Farah, 1985; Finke, 1985; Keenan, 1983). 
Regardless of whether the stimuli were pictures or 
words, imagery dominated when relationships were generated, 
and verbalization dominated when relationships were 
provided. Regardless of whether the source of the 
relationships was external or internal, imagery dominated 
for words, and verbalization dominated for pictures. The 
latter result seems to indicate a propensity for dual 
coding. Yet there was no correlational evidence of an 
advantage for this dual coding. 
One correlation that would have supported a dual-
coding interpretation—a positive one between recall and 
the amount of imagery reported with words—occurred only 
for words in provided relationships. Furthermore, at .26, 
this correlation was even less impressive than the .34 
correlation between recall of these words and usage of a 
relational strategy. 
Discrepancies between the reported use of a verbal 
strategy and the pattern of recall also pose problems for a 
dual-coding account. To support an advantage for dual over 
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amodal processing, verbalization should be an especially 
useful strategy with pictures or in conjunction with 
deliberate image construction. But although more "thinking 
of the names" was indeed reported with pictures than with 
words, the usage pattern had no clear relevance to recall. 
To to further confound a dual-coding interpretation of the 
recall results, a combination imaginal-verbal strategy 
(Table 3) was apparently no more used, or useful, than any 
other, in any condition. 
The negative correlations are also suggestive. It 
seems that imaginally elaborating a generated relationship 
can actually depress recall, especially for pictures 
(-.39), and covert naming seems to be an unfortunate 
strategy in all circumstances. Furthermore, speaking 
without thinking (the "none" strategy), although reportedly 
a rare experience in all conditions, may be particularly 
unhelpful (-.43) for those who might need to remember 
verbally provided information. 
Questions 
Even though predictions based strictly on a picture 
superiority effect were not confirmed, dual coding could be 
invoked to explain the retrieval results. The task of 
generating a preposition might have benefited separate word 
pairs by heightening the vividness of mediational images. 
Perhaps by comparison the preposition-linked nouns evoked 
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only vague or fleeting images. Although this possibility 
seems to strain the dual coding model, which does not claim 
that the mnemonic advantage of mediational imagery is 
greater .for separate words than for coherent prose (Paivio, 
1971, 1986), it was considered in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2: Equating the Mnemonic Value of 
Words and Pictures Through Generated 
Imaginal Elaboration 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that words can promote 
recall as effectively as pictures when a relationship is 
generated. To determine whether either imaginal mediation 
or semantic generation is a sufficient explanation of this 
finding, Experiment 2 considered the ways in which the 
pattern of recall that occurred with the verbal task of 
Experiment 1 might be altered when the orienting task was 
explicitly imaginal. As in Experiment 1, two predictions 
could be made, depending on the mnemonic theory invoked. 
Experiment 2 Predictions 
Extensive Elaboration Predictions 
Whether a concept should be more extensively 
elaborated in forming an image of the picture of an 
instance or in forming an image of an instance while 
reading the name is unclear from a dual coding perspective. 
If only the hypothesized additive effect of two codes is 
considered, a prediction opposite to that of Experiment 1 
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might be made: higher recall for words plus images, lower 
for pictures plus images. However, the dual-coding 
proposition that pictures evoke their labels more readily 
than the labels evoke images (Paivio, 1971, p. 179) 
confuses the issue, since it suggests that even with an 
imaginal orientation, pictures might be more likely than 
words to be coded in two ways, so that the predictions of 
Experiment 1 might still be made: higher recall for 
pictures, lower for words. The operation of both 
propositions—that words benefit from deliberate imagery 
and that pictures tend to be automatically labeled—could 
also mean that the probable result of an imaginal 
orientation would be both verbal and visual representation 
with either pictures or words. In order to do justice to 
the dual-coding account of the mnemonic value of imaginal 
elaboration, it therefore seemed necessary to predict high 
recall for both pictures and words in Experiment 2, as 
indicated in Table 5. 
Evidence of the efficacy of images as a retrieval-
enhancing second code should be provided by the image-
vividness ratings as well as by the strategy reports. If 
images are induced more directly by pictures than by words, 
then pictures should promote the more vivid imagery. Since 
the task requires attention to specific relationship, the 
most vivid images might be expected with pictures that 
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provide these relationships. The weakest images might be 
expected with separate nouns for which relational images 
must be constructed. If memory performance depends on 
imagery, it should correlate with these values. 
Furthermore, the correlation should be higher for words, 
for which images would provide the dual code, than for 
pictures, for which verbal coding would be crucial. 
SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: Pics Words Pics Words 
Extensive Elaboration High High High High 
Convergent Elaboration Low High High High 
Table 5. Extensive elaboration and convergent elaboration 
recall predictions for pictures and words in provided and 
generated relationships with imaginal orienting task. 
If imaginal elaboration confers a retrieval advantage, 
positive correlations between recall and the strategy-
report estimates of relative reliance on imagery should 
also occur. The correlation should be highest with 
separate words, the stimuli for which an imaginal code is 
presumably most needed. Conversely, the correlation 
between recall and a verbal strategy should be higher with 
pictures than with words. 
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Convergent Elaboration Predictions 
As Table 5 shows, predictions based on convergence of 
elaboration again partially accord with those based on the 
principle of extensive elaboration. Like an imagery 
effect, a convergence effect would mean high recall for 
both word conditions and for picture pairs which are to be 
imaginally related. However, a convergence effect would 
mean low recall for pictures that leave little to the 
imagination. 
Since convergence predictions depend on the degree to 
which the combination of stimulus characteristics and 
processing orientation concentrate elaboration on the cue-
target relationship, recall was not expected to duplicate 
the pattern obtained with the verbal task of Experiment 1. 
In fact, instructions to visualize the relationship were 
expected to eliminate the picture superiority effect for 
provided as well as generated relationships. 
With a task explicitly directing processing to 
perceptual associations, the more rudimentary stimuli 
should have the advantage. Since decontextualized words 
carry the minimum obligatory perceptual baggage, they are 
especially versatile. In the context of an imaginal 
paired-associate task, they should evoke only the 
perceptual associations that are consistent with the primed 
relationships. Accordingly, there seemed no compelling 
reason to expect more or less convergence on a relationship 
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when elaboration was constrained by a given preposition 
than when it was constrained by a choice of two 
prepositions, so high recall was predicted in both word 
conditions. 
Whereas the latitude permitted by a phrase would 
promote elaboration that converged on the specified 
relationship, the irrelevant detail in the picture of a 
particular interaction would induce elaboration that 
diverged from the relational concept. Unlike the task of 
verbalizing this interaction, which would counteract the 
inherently wide scope of pictorial processing, an imaginal 
orientation would encourage divergent elaboration. 
Therefore the poorest recall should occur with pictorially 
provided relationships. 
The speculation, discussed under Elaborative 
Convergence Predictions for Experiment 1, that the 
divergent elaboration induced by perceptual detail in the 
separate pictures might make them less amenable than their 
labels to relational convergence seemed justified by the 
trend in the cued-recall data of Experiment 1 (an 
8-percentage-point advantage for Words, Generated, over 
Pictures, Generated). However, since this difference was 
not significant, it was assumed that any tendency toward 
elaboration of the pictured objects as separate concepts 
would be counteracted by the attempt to imagine an 
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integrated concept. Therefore high and equal recall was 
again predicted in both generation conditions. 
Because prior experience with a relational concept 
should reduce the search for associations relevant to such 
a concept, a recall advantage was again predicted for 
likely pairings. As in Experiment 1, the likelihood 
advantage was expected to be greater for generated than for 
provided relationships. However, because this likelihood 
effect would reflect the strength of the cue-target 
association, it was not predicted in recognition. 
Elaborative convergence would not predict a strong 
correlation between recall and image vividness ratings or 
the reported use of an imaginal strategy. Assuming that 
imagery is the conscious product of an unconscious 
elaborative process, its vividness might indicate the 
strength of perceptual associations which are either 
relevant or irrelevant to the relational concept on which 
cued recall depends. Even though reported image vividness 
may well reflect the explicitness of the stimuli or the 
relational cohesiveness of the task and thus may often 
covary with recall, certain combinations of stimuli and 
task should intensify the impression of imagery without 
promoting the appropriate convergence. In such conditions 
—i.e., with interactive pictures, which, while providing 
the target relationship, also show distinctive features 
extraneous to it—relational processing should be 
76 
attenuated and retrieval should suffer, even though the 
stimulus may be rated highly imageable. 
Summary of Experiment 2 Predictions 
The stimuli were those shown in Experiment 1: pairs 
of pictures or their labels, either separate or 
interactive. The orienting task was to rate the vividness 
of one's image of a (or the) relationship between the 
items. The pattern of cued recall was again expected to 
invalidate explanations based exclusively on either 
stimulus or task effects. 
Contrary to the picture superiority effect, high 
recall was predicted for words as well as for pictures when 
a cue-target relationship was generated, and higher recall 
was predicted for words than for pictures when a 
relationship was provided; contrary to the generation 
effect, high recall was predicted for provided as well as 
for generated pictures. Furthermore, contrary to the 
imagery effect, an imaginal task was not expected to 
promote recall of interactive pictures, and neither imagery 
vividness ratings nor reported reliance on an imaginal 
strategy was expected to correlate with recall. As before, 
the more likely pairs were expected to be better recalled 
across conditions. 
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Experiment 2 Method 
Design AOd Subjects 
With the exception of the orienting task, the design 
was identical to that of Experiment 1. The 114 righthanded 
undergraduate participants were recruited from the same 
subject pool as were those in Experiment 1 but during the 
following semester. Although both genders were represented 
in every stimulus-task condition, women predominated by a 
ratio of six to one. 
Materials 
A form for rating image vividness was added to the 
materials used in Experiment 1. It consisted of a sample 
five-unit scale and 30 horizontal spaced arrays of the 
numerals 1 to 5, plus four practice arrays. Although there 
were only 20 experimental stimulus pairs, the extra 10 
rating scales were included to prevent anticipation of the 
end of the list and differential processing of the final 
stimuli. (Appendix E shows this rating form.) 
Procedure 
Experiment 2 was conducted in a classroom, in groups 
of from 14 to 16 undergraduates. 
Instructions. The procedure was described as a study 
of the usefulness of visual images in making judgments 
about things that are easy to visualize. 
In the Relationship-Provided conditions, subjects with 
Picture stimuli were told to "hold the image of the 
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relationship"; subjects with Word stimuli were told to 
"form an image of the relationship." In the Relationship-
Generated conditions, subjects with Picture stimuli were 
told to "form an image that relates the objects so that the 
one shown on the left of the screen is in or on the one 
shown on the right"? subjects with Word stimuli were told 
to "form ah image relating the objects so that the one 
named on the left of the screen is in or on the one named 
on the right." (The basic Imaginal Task instructions for 
Relationship-Provided and Relationship-Generated stimuli, 
each with the variations in wording used in the Picture and 
Word conditions, are in Appendix D.) 
Regardless of Source of Relationship or Stimulus Mode, 
the task was described as rating the vividness of "your 
image." The experimenter stressed the importance of doing 
the ratings conscientiously, explaining that these ratings 
would be compared with those of students in other groups. 
Training. The experimenter distributed the image 
vividness rating forms (Appendix E) and told the students 
to use the practice scales at the top, then presented the 
same four training stimuli seen by subjects in the 
corresponding condition of Experiment l. Before starting 
the acquisition sequence, the experimenter ascertained that 
all participants felt confident about their ability to 
perform the rating task. 
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Acquisition and testing. Each group saw one of the 
eight videotaped sequences used in Experiment 1. In order 
to help the students to relax and concentrate on visual 
imagery, the experimenter dimmed the room lights and sat 
out of sight behind a carrel during the acquisition stage 
of the procedure. As in Experiment 1, the videotape was 
stopped unexpectedly after the asterisk display signalling 
the onset of stimulus pair 21. Then the experimenter 
restored the normal lighting, collected the imagery rating 
forms, and presented the strategy-reporting task as the 
purpose of the study. The only variation from the 
procedure of Experiment 1 during the rest of the session 
was that in order to prevent communication among the 
participants, the experimenter remained visible. 
Experiment 2 Results 
Retention 
As in Experiment 1, the initial analyses showed no 
List or Gender effects, so the data were collapsed across 
these factors. As Table 6 indicates, imagery instructions 
did not just eliminate the picture superiority effect but 
reversed it in both tests of retention. 
Cued recall. For each of the following between-group 
F ratios, MSe (1,110) = 825.9. The attempt to form 
interactive images produced a main effect for Stimulus Mode 
(Pictures, 58.4%; Words, 71.1%; F = 11.5 and a Mode x 
Source interaction (F = 8.9. This significance was due 
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entirely to a disadvantage for interactive pictures. 
Phrases prevailed in the Relationship-Provided conditions 
[Pictures, 49.5%; Words, 73.8%; t (26) = 3.2], and separate 
pictures prevailed in the Picture conditions [Provided, 
49.5%; Generated, 66.8%; t (27) = 2.3]. Neither of these 
effects is compatible with either the imagery or the 
generation predictions shown in Table 5. 
SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: Pics Words Pics Words 
n: (28) (28) (30) (28) 
CUED RECALL: 49 74 67 68 
Likely 57 76 73 78 
Unlikely 42 71 61 59 
RECOGNITION: 72 89 82 88 
Likely 78 91 88 92 
Unlikely 66 88 76 85 
Table 6. Percentage recall and recognition of pictures and 
words in provided and generated likely and unlikely 
relationships with imaginal orienting task (Exp. 2). 
They are compatible with convergence predictions, as 
is the high recall in the Word conditions (Provided, 73.8%; 
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Generated, 68.4%) and the statistical equivalence of these 
means and the 66.8% recall for Pictures, Generated. 
Nevertheless, this pattern of recall would also accord with 
an interpretation of generation effects that included 
imaginal generation, so further evidence of the causal role 
of differential convergence seems to be needed. 
The case for an elaborative convergence interpretation 
is strengthened by the breakdown of scores in Table 6. The 
more likely relationships again had an over-all recall 
advantage [Likely, 71.1%; Unlikely, 58.2%; £ (1,110) = 
40.5, MSe = 231.3], and this advantage again did not 
interact with Stimulus Mode nor with Source of 
Relationship, although a three-way Mode x Source x 
Likelihood interaction did occur (F = 4.6). The difference 
produced by Likelihood was significant in all conditions 
except Words, Provided, in which even the unlikely pairings 
benefitted from an imaginal orientation. 
Recognition. As the scores in Table 6 indicate, 
recognition raised the retrieval level [Recall, 64.6%; 
Recognition, 82.8%; F = 230.8, MSe (1,110) = 81.4] but did 
not appreciably change its pattern. For every between-
subjects F ratio reported for recognition scores, 
MSe (1,110) = 331.0. The cued-recall main effect of 
Stimulus Mode was maintained (Pictures, 77.1%; 
Words, 88.7%; F = 23.8, but no Mode x Source interaction 
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occurred. Although recognition in the three high-recall 
conditions did not differ significantly, recognition of the 
Pictures, Provided, targets (71.8%) was inferior to that of 
the other conditions by at least 10 percentage points 
[t (28-29) = 2.1 to 3.6]. That is, the attempt to retain 
images of pictures impaired memory for the items as well as 
for the relationships depicted. 
In Experiment 1, the likelihood effect that occurred 
in cued recall was eliminated in recognition. In 
Experiment 2, this effect was apparent in both recall and 
recognition [Likely, 87.1%; Unlikely, 78.4%; F = 34.3, 
MSe (1,110) = 123.3]. Likelihood interacted with Stimulus 
Mode (F = 5.5) but not with Source of Relationship. As the 
breakdown of scores in Table 6 indicates, the conditions in 
which items presented in the more likely contexts were 
better recognized were the same conditions in which they 
were better recalled when cued by a contextual element 
[t (26-28) = 2.4 to 4.2]. The recognition advantage for 
targets from likely contexts was nonsignificant only for 
Words, Provided (Likely, 90.7%; Unlikely, 87.5%). 
Reported Strategies 
As would be expected with an explicitly imaginal task, 
every strategy with a reported usage of over 20% involved 
imagery. Table 7 shows that whereas pure I was reported 
more with verbal than with pictorial stimuli, I-R was the 
dominant strategy in all conditions except Pictures, 
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Provided, for which I-V was preferred. Nevertheless, as 
the Pearson r coefficients in Table 7 reveal, none of this 
experienced imagery improved recall. The only significant 
correlations were negative. (With df = 26-28, the critical 
r values for one-tailed tests are .317-.306, and for two-
tailed tests, .374-361.) With Words, Provided, both 
V (-.499) and R (-.493) seemed to be inappropriate 
strategies, and with Pictures, Provided, I (-.452) was 
apparently the wrong approach. 
As before, the eight strategies were collapsed into 
three basic strategies in order to clarify their effects. 
Imagery remained by far the dominant strategy (I, 85.6%; 
V, 41.3%; R, 45.8%). But some between-group variations 
appear in Table 8 that are less apparent in Table 7. 
The incidence of reported I was especially high for 
verbal stimuli [Pictures, 80.7%; Words, 90.6%; t (55) = 
1.9], and the affinity between words and I was even greater 
when relational generative was required [Pictures, 
Generated, 79.5%; Words, Generated, 94.4%; t (26) = 2.1]. 
With relationships provided, Stimulus Mode did not 
significantly affect I (Pictures, Provided, 81.9%; Words, 
Provided, 86.8%;). Nevertheless, generation per se did not 
increase I for either Pictures (Provided, 81.9%; Generated, 
79.5%) or Words (Provided, 86.8%; Generated, 94.4%). 
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SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: 
n: 
Pics 
(28) 
Words 
(28) 
Pics 
(30) 
Words 
(28) 
CUED RECALL: 49 74 67 68 
IMAGINAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
17 
-.45** 
26 
'.19 
18 
.20 
28 
-.11 
IMAGINAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
13 
-.10 
34 
.29 
40 
.01 
38 
.10 
VERBAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
14 
-.06 
6 
-.50** 
8 
-.15 
3 
-.19 
VERBAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
1 
-.14 
0 5 
-.26 
2 
-.06 
IMAGINAL-VERBAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
39 
.17 
17 
-.15 
14 
-.21 
18 
.00 
IMAGINAL-VERBAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 13 
Usage-Recall r .28 
9 
.19 
8 
.16 
11 
.08 
RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
2 
.06 
4 
-.49** 
3 
.16 
1 
-.14 
NONE: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
1 
-.33 
4 
-.18 
5 
.00 
1 
-.13 
Table 7. Percentage reported usage of eight strategies 
with imaginal orienting task, and correlation of strategy 
usage with recall (Exp. 2). 
* * = ! > <  - 0 1  
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SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: Pics Words Pics Words 
n: (28) (28) (30) (28) 
CUED RECALL: 49 74 67 68 
IMAGINAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 82 87 80 94 
Usage-Recall r .09 .49** .13 .24 
VERBAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 67 32 34 33 
Usage-Recall r .38** -.15 -.18 .01 
RELATIONAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 27 46 56 53 
Usage-Recall r .18 .25 .06 -.10 
Table 8. Percentage reported usage of three basic 
strategies for pictures and words in provided and generated 
relationships with imaginal orienting task, and correlation 
of strategy usage with recall (Exp. 2). 
__________ 
Although the percentages reported for both Verbal and 
Relational processing were relatively low, each of these 
strategies was also influenced by stimulus variables. The 
use of V was significantly greater with interactive 
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pictures than with any other stimuli [Pictures, Provided, 
66.5%; Words, Provided, 32.1%; Pictures, Generated, 33.8%; 
Words, Generated, 33.1%; t (27-28) = 4.5 to 4.7]. The use 
of R showed the opposite pattern with relationships 
provided [Pictures, Provided, 27.4%; Words, Provided, 
46.4%; £ (26) = 2.6] and with relationships generated, R 
was high in either mode (Pictures, Generated, 55.6%; Words, 
Generated, 53.1%). An increase in R usage with generation 
occurred with Pictures [Provided, 27.4%; Generated, 55.6%; 
t (27) = 3.9] but not with Words (Provided, 46.4%; 
Generated, 53.1%). 
In other words, reported I was unrelated to the 
pattern of recall, since it was as high for Pictures, 
Provided, as for Pictures, Generated, or Words, Provided; 
reported V was inversely related to the pattern of recall; 
and reported R parallelled the pattern of recall: 
significantly lower with Pictures, Provided, than with the 
other three conditions. These observations are offered 
only as preliminary information. The issue addressed by 
this research is not the extent to which a strategy is used 
but the extent to which its usage is mnemonically 
effective. As the r values in Table 8 indicate, each of 
the strategies had its value for particular stimulus-task 
combinations, but none was impressive in all cases. 
The Usage-Recall correlation of reported I (.251) was 
significant but low across conditions. (For df = 112, the 
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critical one-tailed r value is .160.) Within conditions, 
the I experience to some extent reflected I 
effectiveness, since the correlations were lower with 
pictures than with words, and for Words, Provided, a 
respectable correlation occurred (.487). However, for 
Words, Generated, the condition which dual coding theory 
should expect to benefit most from mediational imagery, the 
correlation was low and nonsignificant (.238). 
Usage and effectiveness corresponded to some extent 
with a V strategy, as well, since the condition in which 
the most V was reported, Pictures, Provided, produced a 
low-to-moderate Usage-Recall correlation (.380). Yet V was 
apparently ineffective in all of the high-recall 
conditions, including Pictures, Generated (-.182), a 
condition in which, by dual-coding criteria, it should be a 
major determinant of recall. R, although reportedly used 
more in the generated conditions, seemed to be more useful 
when relationships were provided, although the highest 
Usage-Recall correlation for R (Words, Provided, .252) was 
not significant. 
Image Vividness Ratings 
As Table 9 shows, mean image vividness ratings did 
not parallel recall. Despite the disadvantage in recall 
for Pictures, Provided, images based on pictures were rated 
as vivid as those based on words on the 5-point scale 
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SOURCE OF RELATIONSHIP: Provided Generated 
STIMULUS MODE: Pics Words Pics Words 
n: (28) (28) (30) (28) 
CUED RECALL: 49 74 67 68 
IMAGE VIVIDNESS: 4.0 3.7 3.1 3.3 
Likely 4.1 4.1 3.7 4.0 
Unlikely 3.9 3.3 2.6 2.7 
VIVIDNESS-RECALL r: .21 .27* .49** .64** 
Likely .22 .31 .47** .60** 
Unlikely .03 .12 .34 .34 
Table 9. Image vividness ratings (1-5) and correlation of 
vividness with recall for pictures and words in provided 
and generated likely and unlikely relationships (Exp. 2). 
* = £ < .05; ** = e , .01 
(Pictures, 3.5; Words, 3.5), and the attempt to generate a 
nonspecified relationship reduced, rather than increased, 
the sense of image vividness [Provided, 3.85; 
Generated, 3.23; F (1,110) = 25.7, MSe = 84.3]. 
Furthermore, the detrimental effect of generation on 
imagery was due primarily to the difficulty of generating 
an interactive image of separately pictured objects 
[Pictures. Provided, 4.0; Pictures, Generated, 3.1; 
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t (27) = 3.6]. When the stimuli were verbal, generative 
processing did not significantly impair imagery 
(Words, Provided, 3.7; Words, Generated, 3.3). 
A comparison of the rated vividness of the image 
induced by each stimulus and recall of that stimulus 
testifies further to the fallacy of the idea that imaginal 
processing always improves memory. The overall 
correlation of image vividness and recall was an 
unimpressive .033. However, with the critical r = .22 (for 
a two-tailed test with df = 78), the correlation was weakly 
significant with verbal stimuli (Pictures, .11; Words, .29) 
and strongly significant with generated concepts 
(Provided, -.06; Generated, .56;). 
As Table 9 also reveals, likelihood strongly affected 
imageability in all conditions as well as over-all (Likely, 
4.0; Unlikely, 3.1; F = 230.7; MSe = 17.20. The likelihood 
advantage is apparent in the Vividness-Recall correlations, 
particularly when the relationship between Likely pairings 
was Generated (r = .56), and most of all when these 
separate, plausible pairs were presented as Words 
(r = .60). 
One other curious finding about experienced imagery 
makes claims for its mnemonic value rather dubious: The 
usage of an imaginal strategy reported by each subject did 
not correlate with that subject's judgments of image 
90 
vividness (I-Vividness r = .08). The I-Usage-Vividness 
correlation for Words, Provided, the only condition with a 
significant I-Recall correlation (see Table 8), was 
nonsignificant [r (26) = .30], and the level of reliance on 
an imaginal strategy in the other conditions had even less 
relevance to the reported quality of the images (r = 
-.10 to .07). 
As a final test of the role of imagery in the 
differential recall produced by an imaginal task, the 
subjects were split into equal groups of high and low (H 
and L) "imagers" on the basis of their mean vividness 
ratings. Slightly more women (52%) than men (44%) were in 
the H category, which constituted exactly 50% of the 
subjects in each task-stimulus condition. The high imagers 
did recall more than low imagers [H, 69.1%; L, 60.2%; 
F (1,106) = 5.6, MSe = 808.0], and the difference was 
consistent in every condition. 
The two groups differed in their reliance on an 
Imaginal strategy (I, H, 91.4%; I, L, 84.2%), but the 
difference was due entirely to their approach to 
relationships which were Provided. This difference was as 
pronounced for Words, Provided (I, H, 96.1%; I, L, 77.5%) 
as for Pictures, Provided (I, H, 98.4%; I, L, 82.3%). The 
groups used imagery to the same extent for relationships 
which they Generated (I, H, 85.6; I, L, 88.4%). 
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High imagers also tended to report more usage of a 
Verbal strategy than did low imagers (V, H, 44.7? 
V, L, 38.7), and the difference was greater for Words 
(V, H, 37.8%; V, L, 27.8%) than for Pictures (V, H, 51.6%; 
V, L, 49.6%). However, low imagers reported more 
relational processing (R, H, 42.2%; R, L, 49.3%) in every 
condition except Pictures, Generated. In other words, no 
matter how the quality of imagery was assessed, it did not 
explain the low recall of the interactive pictures. 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
The main question addressed by Experiment 2 was the 
effect of provided or generated elaboration on the mnemonic 
value of visual imagery. Subjects were required to rate 
the vividness of their imaginal representations of 
relationships between pairs of objects. The relationships 
were evoked by stimuli at four levels of perceptual and 
conceptual explicitness. Later, a surprise test of recall 
of one member of each pair was cued by the other. If the 
picture superiority and generation effects produced in 
Experiment 1 by a verbal task were really imagery effects— 
that is, if image formation was automatic when pictures 
were presented or when a relational concept was generated 
but not when the concept was provided by words—then both 
effects should have disappeared in Experiment 2: (1) The 
deliberate formation of images should have raised recall in 
the Words, Provided, condition to the: lovel achieved in the 
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Words, Generated, condition, and (2) Picture pairs should 
have produced superior recall, as in Experiment 1, whether 
relationships were provided or generated. 
Memory 
Experiment 2 confirmed the predictions of a 
convergence account of elaboration (see Table 5). The 
picture superiority effect was not only eliminated but 
reversed by an explicitly imaginal task. Memory for 
interactive pictures was significantly worse than memory 
for words. The generation effect, which in Experiment 1 
occurred only with words, occurred only with pictures in 
Experiment 2. (Figure 2 provides a simplified reminder of 
these results, which are presented in greater detail in 
Table 6.) The imaginal task focused elaboration on 
perceptual aspects of the cue-target relationship, and the 
stimulus pairs which profited most from this focus were the 
less explicit ones—those lacking either all perceptual 
particulars or particulars about their relationship, the 
pairs which, without such a constraining task, might have 
been diffusely or irrelevantly elaborated. The pairs which 
profited least were those providing a surfeit of perceptual 
particulars—interactive pictures. 
While providing relational information, the picture of 
a particular lamp on a particular turtle also conveys 
information that is irrelevant to the relationship. It 
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IMAGED RELATIONSHIP 
Generated 
lamp on turtle 
o 67 
CR 
Provided » 49 
—i i 
Words Pictures 
Figure 2. Percentage recall of pictures and words in 
provided and generated relationships with imaginal 
orienting task (Exp. 2). 
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seems likely that with a task requiring imaginal 
elaboration, this information cannot be ignored. Relative 
to a three-word phrase, which imposes no particular 
perceptual associations, interactive pictures would promote 
superfluous elaboration, precluding a potential subjective 
instantiation of the relational concept and leaving the 
integration of cue and target correspondingly weak. 
The reversal in Experiment 2 of the apparent picture 
superiority effect in Experiment 1 (compare Figures 1 and 
2) can be explained by a single principle. Generation of 
the appropriate preposition promoted recall when the cue-
target relationship was explicitly depicted, and generation 
of an appropriate image promoted recall when the 
relationship was indicated by a phrase. That is, whenever 
the task directed elaboration more to the relationship than 
to other explicit information about the separate component 
concepts or to other implicit associations of these 
concepts, the effectiveness of one of the components in 
accessing the other increased. When the relationship was 
generated, either a verbal or an imaginal orientation 
promoted recall. 
The convergence of elaboration on generated concepts 
can also.explain the elimination in both procedures of the 
usual superiority of interactive to separate pictures and 
of relational phrases to unrelated nouns. In Experiment 1 
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words linked only by a hyphen were better recalled than the 
same words presented in a comprehensible relationship, and 
in Experiment 2 pictures that were only adjacent were 
better recalled than the same pictures combined to show an 
interactive relationship. There is no doubt about the 
general vigor of stimulus-provided organization effects. 
Therefore it seemed excessive to include in the design of 
either experiment the no-generation, separate-presentation 
conditions that would more conclusively have demonstrated 
the mutability of these effects. (This outcome is only 
mentioned.) 
Whereas with the verbal orientation of Experiment 1, 
likely relationships had an advantage only when they were 
generated, with the imaginal orientation of Experiment 2, 
a likelihood advantage also occurred for pictorially 
provided relationships. It seems plausible that even with 
a stimulus-task combination that induces the processing of 
nonsalient perceptual features, the associations between 
likely pairs promote stronger relational convergence than 
do the nonspecific associations between unlikely pairs. 
There was only one exception to the likelihood effect: 
Nouns presented in improbable phrases were recalled nearly 
as well as were nouns in more familiar contexts. Since the 
diffuse processing which ordinarily would be induced by the 
vagueness of three-word phrases would be even greater when 
the phrases expressed unfamiliar concepts, the relatively 
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high recall of these nouns seems to indicate the 
effectiveness of the imaginal task in imposing perceptual 
specificity on this processing. 
Recognition memory was again similar to that of cued 
recall, with significantly lower recognition of the names 
of objects which had appeared in interactive pictures. 
Even though this result was not predicted, it does seem to 
disconfirm the possibility that the low recognition of 
words from relational phrases in Experiment 1 was due to 
something inherent in these stimuli. Instead, the 
recognition data suggest that the stimulus-task interaction 
that determines the accessibility of a relationship between 
two concepts also affects the accessibility of the concepts 
as separate events. 
Although in Experiment 1 there was no likelihood 
effect in recognition, in Experiment 2, the pattern of 
superior recall for likely pairs was retained in 
recognition. The only exceptions were the words from 
unlikely phrases, which were both recognized and recalled 
as well as any other targets. The likelihood effect in 
recognition was especially strong for items originally 
presented as pictures. Thus the poorest recognition 
occurred for items which had been depicted in unlikely 
relationships, contrary to the supposed mnemonic benefits 
of pictures, of provided organization, and of bizarreness. 
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The effort hypothesis. An alternative interpretation 
of the memory results of Experiments 1 and 2 that has been 
suggested is that they simply indicate the processing 
resources needed to comply with the orienting task. By 
this reasoning, the task of constructing a sentence 
expressing an "in" or "on" relationship in Experiment 1 
might be least effortful in the low-recall condition, since 
the stimuli provided the content words of the sentence, 
including the linking preposition. Similarly, the task of 
constructing an interactive image in Experiment 2 might be 
least effortful in the low-recall condition, since the 
stimuli were pictorial and showed the interaction. There 
are at least three objections to this proposal. 
First, the cognitive effort, or capacity, devoted to 
any task is not an obvious attribute of the task. As 
pointed out by Mitchell and Hunt (1989), it can only be 
determined empirically—for example, by measuring the 
decrement from baseline of performance on a concurrent 
capacity-demanding task. Such measures reveal that more 
processing resources may, in fact, be allocated to the 
seemingly easier task (Britton, Westbrook, & Holdredge, 
1978). Therefore, "effort" is not a construct that allows 
a priori predictions. 
Second, if the greater effort required in generating a 
relationship were a sufficient explanation of the advantage 
of separate nouns over phrases in Experiment 1 and of 
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separate pictures over interactive pictures in Experiment 
2, then one would expect both effects to operate in both 
experiments. Presumably, greater effort would also be 
required to generate relationships between the picture 
pairs in Experiment 1 and the noun pairs in Experiment 2 
than to produce the same overt responses when the 
relationships in each mode are provided. Yet in these 
conditions generation of the relationships produced no 
retrieval advantage. 
Third, an effort account implies that novel concepts, 
because they must be constructed of disparate associative 
elements, should be more memorable than concepts which are 
already represented in a unitary form. Therefore higher 
recall should be expected with unlikely than with likely 
relationships. This outcome would correspond to the 
bizarreness effect, the reliability of which is a topic of 
current controversy (Einstein & McDaniel, 1987). The 
consistent advantage in both experiments for the pairings 
rated more likely makes the effort hypothesis—or at least 
an effort hypothesis based on presumed task difficulty— 
untenable. 
The effect of generation. Although cognitive effort 
fails as an explanatory construct, the retrieval patterns 
of both experiments do seem to reflect the extent of 
subjective generation. Certainly, the task of producing a 
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complete sentence expressing a particular relationship or 
of rating the vividness of one's image of a particular 
relationship necessitated some generation in all 
conditions, since in no case was the sentence or the 
interactive piccurcs perceptually available. However, 
generation was presumably more extensive in some of the 
eight stimulus-task combinations tested than in others. 
Not only the Generated conditions but the Provided 
conditions in which stimuli and task were in contrary 
modalities produced effective incidental learning. 
Assuming that the more the stimuli specify the response 
elements, the less generation is required to produce the 
response, the sentence production task would be least 
generative when the stimuli specify the three content words 
and the image formation task would be least generative when 
the stimuli depict the interaction. The sentence task 
would be more generative when only the nouns are provided; 
the image task would be more generative when the 
interactive elements are shown as separate objects. An 
appreciable degree of generation would also be involved in 
converting input in one modality to output in another—with 
pictorial input to the sentence task or verbal input to the 
imaginal task. 
From the first studies on the effect, generation has 
been implicitly defined as verbal production. Although the 
production required in Experiment 2 was nonverbal, the 
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results are consistent with the generation-effect 
perspective outlined. That is, the imagery effect might 
more generally be called a generation effect. Even so, 
both terms simply name a processing orientation. Neither 
one indicates the processing dynamics that produce the 
effect. Neither generation per se nor imagery per se 
explains the differential memory produced by either 
experimental procedure, since every condition required 
generation, and in Experiment 2 the generation was in every 
condition imaginal. It was the quality of the elaborative 
activity induced by the generative task that determined 
memory. The recall pattern obtained reflects the extent to 
which subjective elaboration converged on the critical 
relational concept. 
Strategies 
In accordance with their instructions, the 
participants in Experiment 2 reported more reliance on 
visualization (85.6%) than did those in Experiment 1 
(67.5%). However, as a comparison of the imagery values in 
Tables 4 and 8 suggests, the degree to which imagery is 
experienced may be as much a function of stimulus condition 
as of an imaginal orientation. Just as in Experiment 1, 
the highest incidence of imagery was reported when the 
stimuli for relational processing were separate nouns (94% 
in both experiments). Although in contrast to Experiment 
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1, this imagery value was not significantly higher than 
that reported with phrases, it was higher than that 
reported in either picture condition. In other words, 
although people may be aware of imagery in considering 
things they have just seen, they are even more aware of 
imagery when they consider things they have not seen. 
Furthermore, as the strategy reports of Experiment 1 
indicate, the influence of generation on phenomenological 
imagery may be even greater when the imagery is not 
deliberate. 
Regardless of the complex influence of stimulus 
characteristics and task demands on the strategy employed, 
the question of interest is the usefulness of the strategy. 
Specifically, to what extent did the perceptual elaboration 
that apparently predominated in all conditions of 
Experiment 2 promote cued recall? The higher correlation 
coefficients for words than for pictures in Table 8 do 
provide some support for a dual-coding advantage, but they 
also suggest that imagery at acquisition is not a decisive 
factor in retrieval. Although with both the verbal task of 
Experiment 1 and the imaginal task of Experiment 2 the 
highest correlation of imagery usage and recall occurred 
for phrases, and although with the imaginal task this 
correlation was significant, recall scores were higher in 
Experiment 1, and equally high in Experiment 2, in 
conditions in which they did not correlate with imagery. 
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The relative usage of a verbal strategy again offers 
some support to a dual-coding interpretation. However, the 
correlation data strain this interpretation. The strongest 
indication of dual coding is the 67% awareness of 
verbalization that occurred with interactive pictures. 
Even though this verbalization was apparently insufficient 
to ensure recall of half the target concepts, its moderate 
correlation with recall suggests that it did help. Yet the 
verbalization that occurred during the generation of a 
relationship between pictured objects was of no value to 
memory, a result that dual coding would not predict. 
The finding that the lowest incidence of relational 
processing was reported with interactive pictures, the 
condition of lowest recall, is consistent with an 
interpretation stressing the necessity of convergence on 
the relational concepts. However, the finding that a 
relational strategy was apparently more useful when 
relationships were provided than when recall depended on 
their generation seems contrary to common sense. In fact, 
this anomalous aspect of the correlations between recall 
and the cognizance of relational thought in both 
experiments suggests the plausibility of one or more of the 
following assessments of strategy reports: (1) more of 
item-specific than of relational processing reaches 
consciousness, (2) conscious experience has little 
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correspondence with the processes underlying it, or (3) the 
reported mental experiences are reconstructions based on 
common assumptions or on implicit experimenter demands. 
Image Vividness 
One of the questions addressed in this research is 
whether the usual relative advantage of certain tasks and 
stimuli is better explained by the phenomenal experience of 
vivid imagery or by the specificity of elaboration that 
this vividness may indicate. If the conceptual linkage of 
cue and target depends on the formation of mediating 
images, then cued recall should reflect the quality of 
these images. But to establish that imagery indicates 
effective processing and is not merely a common 
accompaniment of effective processing, it is not enough to 
show that the conditions of higher recall are those in 
which images are more vivid. It must also be shown that 
the better-recalled stimuli are the ones that produce the 
more vivid images and that the subjects who report more 
vivid imagery are the ones who have better recall. 
The correlation of image vividness and recall was weak 
or nonexistent when the images were unlikely or when they 
represented attempts to reproduce pictures (Table 9). The 
vividness-recall correlation was stronger for likely 
concepts, especially those which were not perceptually 
explicit in the stimuli. The correlation was strongest 
when both the item-specific and the relational features of 
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the concepts were generated. So although the intensity of 
the imaginal experience does not reliably indicate the 
efficacy of the processes underlying memory, it does seem 
to indicate the degree to which conceptual generation is 
involved in the processing. 
The median split between high and low "imagers" 
supports this interpretation. When relationships were 
provided, students who rated their images especially vivid 
also reported more reliance on imagery than did students 
who rated their images on the dim side. However, when 
relationships were generated, imagery was not only the 
favored strategy but it was favored equally by all, despite 
differences in the vividness of the experience. 
Questions 
Experiments 1 and 2 each provide evidence that 
relative recall depends on the joint suitability of 
stimulus characteristics and processing orientation for 
directing associative elaboration to the relationship 
between cue and target. Targets for which this 
relationship was provided were well recalled only if the 
task narrowed the scope of processing so that relational 
associations were preferentially elaborated: In 
Experiment 1, sentence production required consideration of 
the relational aspects of pictures, and in Experiment 2, 
visualization required consideration of the relational 
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aspects of phrases. Recall suffered if the task induced 
irrelevant elaboration: In Experiment 1, sentence 
production encouraged indiscriminant attention to the 
separate words in phrases, and in Experiment 2, 
visualization encouraged indiscriminant attention to the 
nonrelational features of complex pictures. 
Yet as results in the generation conditions of both 
experiments show, high recall did not depend on stimuli and 
task being in complementary modes. The symbols that 
initiated processing, whether verbal or pictorial, were not 
what mattered; and the output of processing, whether overt 
or covert, verbal or imaginal, was not what mattered. 
Elaborative convergence predicts that targets for 
which a relationship is generated will be precisely 
integrated with their cues, especially when the generation 
involves elaboration of a familiar concept that is not 
countermanded by the stimuli. Thus separate pictures that 
subjects verbally elaborate as interacting objects and 
separate words that subjects imaginally elaborate as 
interacting objects should not only each be higher on the 
recall continuum than the corresponding integrated stimuli; 
they should be recalled equally well. 
The much stronger positive correlation between image 
vividness ratings and recall when relationships were 
generated than when they were provided is consistent with 
the hypothesis that visual imagery and verbal generation 
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are alternative conscious components of preconscious 
elaboration and that the mnemonic effectiveness of either 
depends on the relational convergence of this elaboration. 
To provide further support for this hypothesis, a direct 
comparison of imagery and generation effects was needed. 
Although Experiments 1 and 2 were nearly identical 
procedurally, the difference between the verbal and 
imaginal orienting tasks prevents the comparison of their 
outcomes. Experiment 1 required the production of an overt 
response in a private session; Experiment 2 required the 
evaluation of a covert experience in a group session. It 
remained to be shown that a form of covert elaboration 
which would not be interpreted as imagery could influence 
recall in the same way as do imagery instructions and that 
a measure of its convergence could correlate with recall in 
the same way as do image vividness ratings. Experiment 3 
was designed to equalize the conditions for verbal and 
imaginal generation so that their effects on both recall 
and task-recall correlations could be compared. 
Experiment 3: Equating the Mnemonic Value 
of Verbal and Imaginal Generation 
The third experiment provided a means of comparing the 
results of the other two. It asked whether the elimination 
of the picture superiority effect found with verbal 
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generation in Experiment 1 and with imaginal generation in 
Experiment 2 would occur with procedures that were strictly 
comparable. In other words, it asked directly whether 
there is anything special about imagery—or whether image 
formation is functionally equivalent to verbal generation. 
The effects of two orienting conditions, verbal and 
imaginal, were compared. Both conditions required the 
generation of a relationship, but in contrast to the tasks 
of Experiments 1 and 2, the relationship was the same in 
all cases: the object named or pictured on the left of the 
screen was to be placed on the one on the right. By 
removing the decision-making component of generation, this 
change not only ensured more consistency between items and 
between subjects but eliminated a complexity that may have 
prolonged the processing that precedes conceptual 
convergence. 
Aside from this simplification, the only procedural 
changes were in the verbal task. Whereas speech production 
was required in Experiment 1, in Experiment 3 the generated 
sentences were not to be overtly expressed. Since it is 
the underlying processing that produces the generation 
effect and not actual articulation (Slamecka & Fevreiski, 
1983), this change was not expected to affect the outcome. 
In addition, to ensure compliance with instructions while 
making the verbal condition even more similar to the 
imaginal, a rating task appropriate to sentences was added. 
108 
The imaginal task was the one used in the generation 
condition of Experiment 2: to form a visual image of each 
relationship and to rate this image on its vividness. The 
verbal task was equally covert: to mentally construct a 
sentence expressing each relationship and to rate this 
sentence on its likelihood. 
Experiment 3, Predictions 
The predictions for each of the two views of 
elaboration were those made for the generation conditions 
of Experiments 1 and 2. That is, Table 10 combines the 
predictions shown under "Generated" in Tables 1 and 5. 
STIMULUS MODE: Pictures Words 
GENERATION TASK: Imaginal Verbal Imaginal Verbal 
Extensive Elaboration High High High Low 
Convergent Elaboration High High High High 
Table 10. Extensive elaboration and convergent elaboration 
recall predictions for pictures and words imaginal 
generation and with verbal generation. 
Extensive Elaboration Predictions 
If a strategy of elaborative image formation were the 
most effective way to improve memory for concrete concepts, 
recall in every Imaginal cell should be better than in the 
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corresponding Verbal cell. However, taking into account 
the dual-coding hypothesis that imagery effects result from 
the augmentation of verbal processing by concurrent 
imaginal processing, high recall would be expected for 
Pictures given Verbal labels as well as for Words given 
Imaginal elaboration. Furthermore, the dual-coding 
explanation of the picture superiority effect—that 
labeling tends to be automatic in picture comprehension— 
should make Pictures as effective with an Imaginal as with 
a Verbal orienting task. Therefore, as shown in Table 10, 
the only stimulus-task combination not liable to show the 
effect of extensive elaboration is that of Words which are 
given only Verbal coding. 
Extensive Elaboration Predictions 
Since only separate picture or word pairs were 
presented in Experiment 3, it was necessary to activate, or 
"generate" conceptual knowledge in every condition in order 
to rate the specified relationship. If instructions to 
verbalize nonpresented relationships in Experiment 1 and to 
form images of nonpresented relationships in Experiment 2 
both enhanced recall in the Generated conditions not by 
increasing elaboration but by focusing it appropriately, 
then high recall should result with either form of 
generation. Furthermore, words and pictures should be 
equivalent stimuli for either form of generation. The 
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convergence principle predictions of uniformly high recall 
across conditions shown in Table 10 would not be an obvious 
result of either imagery or verbal generation as distinct 
phenomena. It might be expected only if the mnemonic value 
of generating images and of generating words were a 
function of the associative convergence they ensured 
between cue and target concepts. 
Summary of Experiment 3 Predictions 
With separate stimulus pairs in all conditions and 
comparable rating tasks, Experiment 3 directly tests the 
relative mnemonic efficacy of verbal generation and visual 
imagery with verbal and pictorial stimuli. Contrary to the 
picture superiority effect, contrary to the imagery effect, 
and contrary to a generation effect based on the conception 
of generation as a verbal phenomenon, each of the four 
stimulus-task combinations is expected to promote high 
recall. The interpretation of this outcome in terms of 
imaginal elaboration is expected to be invalidated, as 
before, by evidence that reported imagery usage does not 
correlate with recall. Correlations of recall with imagery 
vividness and sentence likelihood ratings are expected to 
indicate that imaginal and verbal generation are equivalent 
in their effect. As in the earlier procedures, an 
advantage for the more likely relationships is also 
predicted. 
Ill 
Experiment 2 Method 
Design and Subjects 
The design essentially combined the Generation 
conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. There were four binary 
factors: Stimulus Mode (Pictures or Words), Generation Task 
(Imaginal or Verbal) and List (1 or 2) beween subjects and 
Likelihood of Relationship (Likely and Unlikely) within 
subjects. The participants were 115 righthanded 
undergraduates, 87 women and 28 men. Each of the eight 
Stimulus Mode x Generation Task x List groups had from 12 
to 17 participants. Although both genders were represented 
in every group, no gender differences were expected and so 
no attempt was made to equalize the percentage of men in 
the groups. 
Procedure 
There were only two departures from the Generation 
procedure of Experiment 2: (1) Instead of being required 
to choose between an "in" and an "on" relationship for each 
stimulus pair, the students were given only the "on" 
relationship to consider; (2) The Verbal task closely 
approximated the Imaginal task. For Imaginal Generation, 
the task was to form a visual image of the object pictured 
or named on the left of the screen resting on the object 
pictured or named on the right and to rate this image on 
its vividness. For Verbal Generation, the task was to 
compose a complete sentence of the form "The (name of the 
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object on the left) is on the (name of the object on the 
right)" and to rate this sentence on the likelihood of its 
occurrence in print or speech. (The instructions are in 
Appendix D; the rating forms are in Appendix E.) 
Although generation is customarily confirmed by vocal 
production, a generation effect has been demonstrated 
without overt expression of the generated concept (Slamecka 
& Fevreiski, 1983). Furthermore, subjective reports are 
the only possible confirmation that an imaginal experience 
has occurred. So even though the required sentence would 
not be spoken, its construction to a level of awareness 
that allowed its likelihood to be rated was considered 
sufficient to test the proposition that imaginal and verbal 
generation are essentially identical processes. 
Experiment 3. Results 
Retention 
Neither Gender nor List had a significant effect in 
any analysis, so the data were pooled as before. 
Cued recall. As shown in Table 11, recall was high in 
all conditions, from 71.6% to 80.9%. Consistent with the 
predictions of convergent elaboration shown in Table 10, 
neither Stimulus Mode nor Generation Task nor their 
interaction had a significant effect in the ANOVA, and t 
tests confirmed the equivalence of recall in all between-
subject conditions. Likely relationships were better 
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recalled over all than Unlikely [79.2% vs. 69.5%; 
£ (1,111) = 34.6, MSe = 156.2], and Likelihood did not 
interact with Mode or Task. The likelihood effect occurred 
with Pictures, regardless of Task, and with Words and 
Imaginal Generation [t (23-30) = 3.06-3.89]. However, with 
Words and Verbal Generation, Unlikely cues were as 
effective as Likely ones. 
STIMULUS MODE: Pictures Words 
GENERATION TASK: Imaginal Verbal Imaginal Verbal 
n: (25) (32) (29) (28) 
CUED RECALL: 72 73 72 81 
Likely 77 79 78 83 
Unlikely 66 67 65 79 
RECOGNITION: 86 87 88 94 
Likely 89 91 91 95 
Unlikely 83 82 85 93 
Table 11. Percentage recall and recognition of pictures 
and words in likely and unlikely relationships with 
imaginal generation and with verbal generation (Exp. 3). 
Recognition. Although the nature of the Generation 
Task did not affect recognition and Task did not interact 
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with Stimulus Mode, Words produced better recognition than 
Pictures [91.2% vs. 86.3%; F (1,111) = 6.9, M£e « 1384.5]. 
This main effect was due solely to the superiority of Words 
with Verbal generation (94.3%) over both Pictures, Verbal 
[86.6%; t (28) = 2.14] and Pictures, Imaginal [86.0%; 
t (25) = 2.16]. Recognition did not differ for Words, 
Imaginal, and either Picture condition. 
The effect of Likelihood of Relationship remained 
significant in recognition [Likely, 91.7%; Unlikely, 85.9%; 
F (1,111) = 16.1; MSe = 1843.5]. In contrast to the 
results of Experiment 1, in which likelihood had no effect, 
recognition with Imaginal generation was enhanced when the 
relationship was familiar: Pictures [Likely, 89.2%; 
Unlikely, 82.8%; t (23) = 2.11]; Words [Likely, 91.0%; 
Unlikely, 85.2%; t (25) = 2.01]. In partial agreement with 
the results of Experiment 2, in which the generation of 
likely sentences produced better recognition than did the 
generation of unlikely sentences, the more likely 
relationships had an advantage with Verbal generation, but 
only for Pictures [Likely, 90.9%; Unlikely, 82.2%; 
t (30) = 3.27]. For Words, the covert verbalization of 
relational sentences led to superior recognition of these 
nouns, whether or not the relationship was plausible. 
Reported Strategies 
Table 12, showing the reported usage of eight 
strategies and the correlation of usage and recall, 
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STIMULUS MODE: Pictures Words 
GENERATION TASK: 
n: 
Imaginal 
(25) 
Verbal 
(32) 
Imaginal 
(29) 
Verbal 
(28) 
CUED RECALL: 72 73 72 81 
IMAGINAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
12 
-.33 
8 
.02 
29 
-.23 
27 
-.34 
IMAGINAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
28 
.18 
15 
-.08 
40 
.19 
24 
.12 
VERBAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
7 
.04 
12 
-.01 
8 
-.22 
6 
.28 
VERBAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
10 
.01 
9 
-.17 
1 
.10 
4 
.16 
IMAGINAL-VERBAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
15 
-.12 
15 
.04 
12 
-.33 
9 
-.05 
IMAGINAL-VERBAL-RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 24 
Usage-Recall r .09 
36 
.24 
10 
.27 
28 
.13 
RELATIONAL: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
3 
-.09 
4 
-.22 
0 0 
NONE: 
% Usage 
Usage-Recall r 
1 
.06 
1 
-.37** 
0 1 
.13 
Table 12. Percentage reported usage of eight strategies 
with imaginal generation and with verbal generation, and 
correlation of strategy usage with recall (Exp. 3). 
** = E < .01 
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indicates several trends. Although participants reported a 
preponderance of I and I-R strategies when the task was 
explicitly imaginal (Pictures, 40%; Words, 69%) as well as 
when the verbal elaboration of words was required (51%), 
the correlation of this imagery with recall was either 
negligible or decidedly negative. Purely V and V-R 
strategies were rarely reported, even when instructions 
required such an approach, and except for Words, Verbal, in 
which the weak (.276) strategy-recall correlation is 
further weakened by the fact that it is based on only 6% 
reported usage, a verbal approach seems no more useful than 
an imaginal one. Even when the two approaches were 
combined in an I-V strategy, recall does not seem to have 
benefited. A pure relational strategy was almost never 
reported, so the R usage-recall correlational values are 
meaningless. The one approach that was both frequently 
claimed and for which the claim correlated positively with 
recall in all conditions is the mixed I-V-R strategy. 
Table 13 simplifies the data of Table 12. Over all, 
forming images of the two objects (I, 82,7%) was reported 
to be much more prevalent [t (115) = 7.18] than was 
thinking of the relationship between them (R, 58.8%), which 
was reported to be more prevalent (t = 2.04) than was 
naming them (V, 52.1%). Task condition did not affect this 
reporting sequence. Subjects were apparently aware of I 
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STIMULUS MODE: Pictures Words 
GENERATION TASK: Imaginal Verbal Imaginal Verbal 
n: (25) (32) (29) (28) 
CUED RECALL: 72 73 72 81 
IMAGINAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 76 75 91 89 
Usage-Recall r -.01 .27 -.00 -.13 
VERBAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 59 70 30 49 
Usage-Recall r .03 .05 .01 .25 
RELATIONAL STRATEGY: 
% Usage 62 64 51 58 
Usage-Recall r .25 -.01 .36* .42** 
Table 13. Percentage reported usage of three basic 
strategies for pictures and words with imaginal generation 
and with verbal generation, and correlation of strategy 
usage with recall (Exp. 3). 
and R processing to the same extent whether their orienting 
task was Imaginal (I, 84.2%; R, 56.5%) or Verbal (I, 81.3%; 
R, 60.9%), and the preference for I was as pronounced with 
a Verbal task [t (61) = 4.48] as with an Imaginal task [t 
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(54) = 5.72]. As would be expected, more V was reported by 
the Verbal than by the Imaginal groups [59.7% vs. 43.5%; t 
(57) = 3.45]. For the Verbal groups, equal reliance on 
E (60.9%) and on V (59.7%) was claimed, whereas for the 
Imaginal groups, significantly more R (56.5%) than V 
(43.5%) was claimed [t (54) = 2.70]. 
The nature of the stimuli had little effect on the 
strategy reported. Imagery was claimed more often than 
relational processing with both Pictures [I, 75.4%; 
R, 63.3; t (57) = 2.57] and Words [I, 89.8%; R, 54.5%; 
t (58) = 7.56], and even more I seems to have been 
experienced with Words than with Pictures (89.8% vs. 75.4%; 
t = 3.08). Conversely, much more V was reported for 
Pictures than for Words (64.8% vs. 39.6%; t = 5.37). More 
R was also reported for Pictures than for Words (63.3% vs. 
54.5%; t = 1.87). That is, with Pictures, equal usage was 
claimed for R (63.3%) and V (64.8%), whereas with Words, 
more R than V was claimed (54.5% vs. 39.6%; t = 3.19). 
In combining all strategies involving imagery, 
Table 13 clearly reveals the ineffectiveness of I. (With 
df = 23-30, the critical values for r are .337-.296 for a 
one-tailed test of positive correlation, or .396-.349, if 
inverse correlations are also considered.) The V strategy-
recall correlations are equally feeble. However, two 
moderate but significant correlations did emerge in 
Experiment 3: a reliance on R strategies predicted recall 
119 
with verbal stimuli, regardless of the form of generation 
(Words, Imaginal, .362; Words, Verbal, .415). 
Image Vividness and Sentence Likelihood Ratings 
The question of whether it is the vividness with which 
images were experienced that determined recall is addressed 
by the correlations presented as "Rating-Recall r" in 
Table 14. The data for these correlations are the mean 
vividness rating of each subject in the Imagery conditions, 
or the mean sentence likelihood rating of each subject in 
the Verbal conditions, and that subject's percentage cued 
recall. A moderate but significant positive Vividness-
Recall correlation did occur for Words (r = .397, df = 28). 
However, for Pictures, the Vividness-Recall correlation was 
weakly negative (r = -.112). Interestingly, an almost 
identical pattern occurred for the rated likelihood of the 
sentences generated in the Verbal conditions: a definite 
positive Likelihood-Recall correlation for Words (r = .416, 
df = 27) and a negative correlation for Pictures 
(r = -.116). 
Looking at the correlations between task ratings 
(Image Vividness or Sentence Likelihood) and reported usage 
of the three basic strategies may clarify these results, 
since the finding that relationships rated highly vivid or 
likely were better recalled means little unless the process 
by which the ratings were determined is known. The 
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STIMULUS MODE: Pictures Words 
GENERATION TASK: Image Sentence Image Sentence 
Rating Rating Rating Rating 
n: " (25) (32) (29) (28) 
CUED RECALL: 72 73 72 81 
TASK RATING: 3.3 2.7 3.6 
00 • 
C
M
 
Rating-Recall r -.11 .12 .40** .42** 
TASK-STRATEGY CORRELATION: 
Rating-Imaginal r .01 .12 .28 .19 
Rating-Verbal r -.22 -.09 I •
 o
 
o
 
.51** 
Rating-Relational r .24 -.11 .25 .48** 
Table 14. Ratings (1-5) of image vividness (imaginal 
generation task) and of sentence likelihood (verbal 
generation task) for pictures and words, and correlation of 
ratings with recall and with percentage reported usage of 
imaginal, verbal, and relational strategies (Exp. 3). 
________ 
question of interest is whether those who rated their word-
induced elaborations as imaginally vivid (and who tended to 
recall more words than did those who gave lower vividness 
ratings to their elaborations) based these ratings on 
generated images. As the r values in Table 14 under "Task-
Strategy Correlation" show, the answer seems to be "No." 
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The correlation of judged image Vividness and reported 
I usage is a nonsignificant .280 for Words and only .014 
for Pictures. The correlations of judged sentence 
Likelihood and I usage are also unimpressive. In fact, 
task ratings and strategies correlated significantly only 
with verbal stimuli, a verbal task, and nonimaginal 
strategies. Among those who saw word pairs and generated 
sentences the rated Likelihood of these sentences was 
indicative of the reported usage of both V (r = .509) and R 
(r = .484). 
Task-Task Correlations 
Correlations between the ratings given each stimulus 
pair by the two Task groups, shown in Table 15, demonstrate 
the functional equivalence of the Imaginal and Verbal 
orientations. That is, relationships that produced an 
impression of visual vividness were the same relationships 
that were rated very likely to be expressed in sentences, 
and relationships that seemed more difficult to "visualize" 
were the same relationships that were rated less likely to 
be expressed in sentences. The correspondence between the 
two tasks was striking, regardless of mode of presentation 
(Pictures, r = .775? Words, r = .800; df = 38). It was 
especially close for the Likely relationships (Likely, 
r = .757, Unlikely, r = .616; df = 38) and closest when 
these relationships were conveyed by noun pairs (Words, 
Likely, r = .811; Pictures, Likely, r = .733; df = 18). 
STIMULUS MODE: Pictures Words 
VIVIDNESS-LIKELIHOOD CORRELATION 
r (n = 40) 78** 80** 
Likely Pairs r (n = 20) 
Unlikely Pairs r (n = 20) 
73** 
68** 
81** 
58** 
Table 15. Correlation of imaginal task ratings (vividness) 
with verbal task ratings (sentence likelihood) for 
generated relationships between likely and unlikely pairs 
of pictures and words (Exp. 3). 
Figure 3 provides a schematic representation of the 
recall results of Experiment 3 (from Table 11) in the lower 
graph, along with a reminder of the results of Experiments 
1 and 2, shown on the upper left and right, respectively. 
The recall data of Experiment 3 provide three arguments for 
the principle of elaborative convergence. (1) They 
reaffirm the mnemonic equivalence of verbal and pictorial 
stimuli that was demonstrated by separate means in 
Experiments 1 and 2. (2) They confirm the mnemonic 
equivalence of a verbal and an imaginal task that was 
suggested by a comparison of the results of the first two 
** = E < *01 
Discussion of Experiment 3. 
Memory 
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Figure 3. Percentage recall of pictures and words with 
verbal generation and with imaginal generation (Exp. 3) 
compared with results of comparable conditions 
(Exps. 1 and 2). 
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experiments. The demonstration that the two forms of 
generation can be equally effective suggests that their 
effectiveness may be due to a principle common to both. 
(3) The data also show that the effectiveness of both 
pictorial and verbal stimuli may be equalized by means of 
either a verbal or an imaginal task, discontinuing any 
special advantage for dual coding. This demonstration 
indicates that dual coding is not the reason for the 
generation effects in the cross-modal conditions of 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Recognition performance in Experiment 3, as in the 
high-recall conditions of Experiments 1 and 2, is quite 
accurate, indicating that the encoding process that made 
the target accessible to the cuing item did not compromise 
its integrity as as a distinct entity. That is, 
distinctive characteristics of each of the stimulus items 
were apparently automatically encoded, even though 
elaboration converged on the concept that related them. 
The case for elaborative convergence is strengthened 
by two additional memory results of Experiment 3. (1) Like 
Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 provides no support for 
the notion that bizarre associations, especially if imaged, 
are especially potent mnemonics. The generation of a 
familiar relationship between two nouns increased the 
probability that one would cue the other (relative to the 
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generation of an unfamiliar relationship). The advantage 
for pre-existing relationships, which would link target and 
cue more closely than would novel relationships, indicates 
the appropriate convergence of both the initial elaboration 
and the cuing process. 
(2) Although the difference reached significance only 
in recognition, the most effective stimulus-task 
combination for both tests was, as in Experiment 1, 
separate noun pairs associated verbally. Since of the four 
generation conditions considered, this one was least 
conducive to the processing of extraneous perceptual 
information, this result is especially compatible with an 
account that stresses the quality of elaboration. 
Strategies 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, imagery, although evidently 
widely experienced in all conditions, either did not 
correlate with recall or correlated negatively. Only in 
conjunction with other strategies did imagery show even a 
weak positive correlation with recall, and then only with 
pictures and verbal generation. Although covert naming was 
not reported as a primary strategy in any condition, it 
apparently accompanied most processing, and became most 
prevalent with pictures, especially when verbal generation 
was required. However, the awareness of verbal 
associations, like the awareness of visual associations, 
was apparently irrelevant to recall, producing a weak 
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positive correlation only when both stimuli and task were 
in the verbal mode. 
Relational processing was also reported in every 
condition, primarily as a concomitant of imagery. 
Nevertheless, its correlation with recall was weak for 
pictures related imaginally (and nonexistent for pictures 
related verbally). Relational thinking and recall did 
correlate significantly with noun-pair stimuli, and the 
correlation was highly significant for both verbal and 
imaginal generation. Although a correspondence between 
generation and relational processing might be considered 
consistent with the convergence interpretation of the 
generation effect, the overriding message of this research 
is that subjective reports are valueless. If not, this 
outcome should have appeared in the other two experiments. 
Image Vividness and Sentence Likelihood 
As always, the vividness ratings of images evoked by 
nouns correlated highly with recall. As predicted by a 
convergence account of imagery, however, the likelihood 
ratings of sentences generated from nouns also correlated 
highly with recall. Furthermore, the rating-recall 
correlations of picture-evoked images were slightly 
negative, and those of picture-evoked sentences were 
negligible. That is, verbal stimuli plus the process of 
generating a specified relational concept seemed to produce 
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impressions of specificity or familiarity, the strength of 
which correlated with recall; whether these impressions 
arose from an imaginal or verbal orientation was 
inconsequential. 
Correlations between vividness or likelihood ratings 
and reported usage of the three basic stategies in each 
condition support this interpretation of the usual mnemonic 
advantage for vividly imaged material. If the vivid 
imagery reported by those with high recall scores were the 
reason for their superior memory, these students should be 
those who relied most heavily on an imaginal strategy. Yet 
there is little correlational evidence that the vividness 
ratings were actually based on generated images. In fact, 
"thinking of the relationship," seems to have been as good 
a basis as any for determining "vividness." Sentence 
likelihood ratings, in contrast, did correlate 
significantly with reported usage of both verbal and 
relational strategies. 
One final set of correlations gives additional 
assurance to the conclusion that imagery is not the reason 
for the imagery effect. The agreement between image 
vividness ratings and sentence likelihood ratings for both 
picture and word pairs was remarkable. That is, a 
particular stimulus pairs was apt to receive the same 
rating on either task. The more memorable items—those 
encoded in a likely relationship—received the higher 
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ratings, regardless of task condition. To the extent that 
a relationship was considered perceptually vivid, a 
sentence expressing the relationship was considered likely, 
probably in response to the same processing dynamics. 
Conclusions: The Mnemonic Value of Provided 
or Generated Words or Images 
The major issue addressed in this study was the 
efficacy of two views of elaboration in predicting recall. 
Stimulus-based picture-superiority predictions and task-
based imagery- and generation-effect predictions were 
compared with a qualitative, process-based view, 
convergence of elaboration. Three experiments investigated 
the effect on cued recall and recognition of both 
relatively passive processing and more generative 
processing with verbal and pictorial stimuli. 
Considered as a whole, the experiments demonstrate some 
previously neglected effects: Although pictures can be 
more effective than verbal descriptions in promoting cued 
recall (Experiment 1), with a different processing 
orientation the same verbal descriptions can promote recall 
more effectively than pictures (Experiment 2), and verbal 
and imaginal orienting tasks can be equally effective in 
promoting recall of either words or pictures 
(Experiment 3). Each of these outcomes was produced when 
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processing in one condition was directed more than in the 
other to the relationship between the stimulus items. 
The Role of Task 
Although subjective generation of the relationship was 
the means by which this directed processing was obtained in 
Experiment 3 and in half the conditions of Experiments 1 
and 2, another unusual demonstration, that presented and 
generated information can be equally effective (with 
pictures in Experiment 1 and with words in Experiment 2), 
indicates that it was the focusing effect imposed by 
generation and not generation per se that improved cue 
effectiveness. Provided relationships were as effective as 
generated ones only if the orienting task directed 
elaborative processing to the relationship. Even when 
the relational information was pictorially provided, 
verbalizing it (Experiment 1) reduced attention to 
nonrelational attributes apparent in the picture, promoting 
integration equal to that produced when the relationship 
was generated. In contrast, interactive pictures were 
ineffective stimuli when an imaginal task encouraged 
unfocused processing (Experiment 2) . 
Similarly, by directing elaboration to perceptual 
features of the relationship expressed, an imaginal task 
boosted the effectiveness of preposition-linked nouns to 
the level attained when the relationship was generated 
(Experiment 2). The same noun phrases were ineffective 
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stimuli when a verbal task encouraged diffuse associative 
processing of the concept (Experiment 1). These earlier 
findings indicate that the uniformly high recall 
demonstrated when all conditions required generation of a 
relational concept (Experiment 3) could not be attributed 
solely to verbal or imaginal generation. 
It might still be argued that generation in a broader 
sense was the operative factor in all cases of relatively 
high retrieval. In both experiments, relationship-provided 
conditions produced good recall only with a cross-modal 
task—i.e., only when the required response was to some 
degree generated. However, if this point is conceded, then 
those who raise it must concede that the generation of a 
concept not provided by the stimulus is not essential for a 
"generation effect." However one defines generation, the 
findings presented support the hypothesis that its 
effectiveness results from the focus that it imposes on 
semantic elaboration rather than from the absence of the 
elaborated concept from the stimulus or the presence of a 
particular conscious product of the elaboration, whether 
words or images. 
Taken as a whole, the three experiments indicated that 
any relevance to memory of imagery derived from the 
relational processing that underlay this conscious 
experience. A significant correlation between reported 
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imagery and recall occurred only with a verbally provided 
task when the orienting task was explicitly imaginal and 
only with a verbally provided concept (Experiment 2), even 
though imagery was reported to be the predominant 
accompaniment of generation in every experiment. With a 
pictorially provided concept, it was covert verbalization 
that correlated with recall (but also only during the 
image-production task, Experiment 2). 
The only evidence from a generative task of the 
relevance of conscious thought to later memory were two 
significant correlations between relational thinking and 
recall when the stimuli were separate words. No 
conclusions are justified by this result, however, since it 
occurred only in Experiment 3. 
Although the strategy data are poor predictors of 
relative retrieval, they do generally accord with common 
sense. For example, in the picture conditions of all three 
experiments more verbal than relational processing was 
reported when relationships were provided, but more 
relational than verbal processing was reported when 
relationships were generated. Whether such reports have 
any validity or simply indicate subject compliance with 
expectations is arguable. 
The Role of Stimuli 
In no case was there an advantage for externally 
organized, interactive stimuli over separate pairs in the 
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same mode. In fact, when the external events were 
elaborated by relational knowledge, separate word pairs 
were more effective than coherent phrases (Experiment 1), 
and separate picture pairs were more effective than 
interactive pictures (Experiment 2). 
A final outcome which some might think unusual 
occurred in all conditions in all three experiments. 
Targets in plausible relationships were better recalled 
than targets in less plausible relationships. This 
research was not designed to challenge the bizarreness 
effect, although this effect is inconsistent with a 
principle extolling the benefits of conceptual coherence. 
Nevertheless, there is increasing evidence against the 
popular idea that bizarre images or associations are 
particularly good mnemonic devices (e.g., Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1987; Martin, 1985). To the extent that 
experimenter-provided bizarreness aids memory, it seems to 
do so only with mixed lists of bizarre and common 
relationships, only for short retention intervals, and only 
for free recall (McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). In other 
words, except insofar as they temporarily enhance the 
retrieval of some list items relative to others, unlikely 
pairings seem to be weak pairings. Apparently even 
stimulus-task combinations which promote convergent 
elaboration are less effective when the relationship 
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considered contravenes the existing associative network. 
Questions for Further Study 
Since the convergence appropriate to paired-associate 
learning is that which integrates the cue and the target 
items, convergence effects were predicted only in cued 
recall. Yet in Experiments 1 and 2, recognition accuracy 
dropped when cued recall was poor (when sentences had been 
generated from telegraphic phrases and when images had been 
generated from interactive pictures). This similarity in 
recall and recognition performance suggests that processing 
which benefited relational processing also benefited the 
separate items and that nonrelational processing failed to 
benefit the separate items. In other words, as elaboration 
of the pair converged on a unitary concept, either item 
became an effective retrieval cue—in cued recall, for the 
other component, and in recognition, for itself. 
The unexpected extension of the recall results to 
recognition may have been due to the nature of the 
recognition test. Perhaps it would not have occurred had 
the stimulus pairs as originally shown been provided for 
recognition, instead of the target terms only. Even though 
the relational concept was not especially salient in these 
conditions, the poorly recognized items had presumably been 
encoded in the form in which they were presented—as 
participants in an interactive situation. Certainly, the 
same discrepancy between presentation and recognition 
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stimuli occurred in a high-recognition condition in both 
Experiments 1 and Experiment 2, but in those conditions the 
cross-modal generation involved (in stating the interaction 
in pictures and imagining the interaction in phrases) focused 
processing on the relational concept. Nevertheless, the 
correspondence between recall and recognition patterns 
raises questions that must be addressed in refining the 
convergence interpretation of memory effects. 
Together, the three experiments demonstrate that 
supposed picture superiority, imagery, generation, and even 
organization effects are not absolute. Word and picture 
pairs can promote equal recall when processing involves the 
elaboration of a relationship between the elements; verbal 
and imaginal tasks can promote equal recall when both 
involve this relational elaboration; provided and generated 
relationships can promote equal recall when the combination 
of stimulus mode and processing orientation directs 
processing to the relationship. The findings of the first 
two experiments indicate that the uniformly high recall 
demonstrated in Experiment 3 for words and pictures with 
verbal or imaginal generation cannot be due to stimulus or 
task alone. It can most reasonably be attributed to 
elaborative convergence, the only factor consistently 
associated with higher retrieval in every procedure. 
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CHAPTER III 
GENERAL DISCUSSION: CONVERGENT ELABORATION 
AND REPRESENTATION 
Memory as Structure 
Dual Representation 
Both the picture superiority effect and the benefits 
conferred by image formation are customarily cited as 
confirmation of Paivio's dual coding theory. According to 
Paivio (1971), verbal information is organized primarily 
in a sequential form, nonverbal information in an analogue 
form. In addition to this direct encoding, words may evoke 
visual images and pictures may be labeled, so either form 
of input may also be coded in, and indirectly accessed 
from, the contramodal system. On the premise that two 
codes produce better memory than one, dual coding theory 
predicts an advantage for words that readily evoke visual 
images, relative to more abstract terms, and for pictures 
that readily evoke verbal labels, relative to more 
ambiguous spatial arrays. 
Although dual representation is sufficient to explain 
the advantage of mentally visualizing objects that are 
named and mentally naming objects that are pictured, an 
additional premise is needed to explain the absolute 
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advantage of pictures over words. Paivio (1971) proposed 
that pictures are more likely to evoke labels than are 
labels to evoke images. Accordingly, the picture of a 
familiar object, like the object itself, should be 
virtually certain to excite representations in both coding 
systems. A name, when it occurred in the absence of a 
concrete referent, might be registered only verbally. 
The faster and more reliable crossover to the 
contramodal system for pictures than for words hypothesized 
by dual coding theory presumably reflects the relative 
automaticity of the two processes. That is, the theory 
implies that the parallel processing of spatial information 
is developmentally or evolutionarily more fundamental than 
the serial processing of language. So if generating the 
name of a pictured object is more certain than is 
generating an image of a named oject, it follows that the 
ability to name pictures should be less subject to 
individual differences than the ability to imagine the 
referents of words. 
This implication of dual coding seems to be valid. 
Scores on tests of verbal memory tend to correlate with 
scores on tests of imagery ability and with introspective 
reports on imagery use, which vary widely (Paivio, 1971). 
Some adults report no strategic use of imagery at all. 
Dual coding theory therefore supposes the dual 
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representation of a stimulus word, even one rated highly 
imageable, to be problematic, depending on both the time 
available for image formation and the individual's 
propensity to process language imaginally. 
The Problem with Dual Representation 
The weakness of dual coding theory is that it can 
claim credit for too many results. For example, since it 
assumes that a generated image and a presented picture 
enhance memory by the same process (Paivio, 1971), dual 
coding makes no clear prediction about the relative 
effectiveness for words and pictures of an imaginal 
strategy. In accordance with the premise that two codes 
are preferable to one, words plus imagery should produce 
better recall than pictures plus imagery. However, in 
accordance with the premise that pictures also enjoy an 
absolute advantage over words, the picture superiority 
effect might prevail, even when imagery is generated in 
both conditions. Alternatively, the picture and imagery 
effects might cancel each other, producing equal recall in 
the two stimulus modalities. 
The relative mnemonic value of pictures and words with 
an imaginal orienting task is not the only point on which 
dual coding theory is noncommittal. Since it maintains 
that mediational imagery is effective as either a 
deliberate strategy or a spontaneous accompaniment of 
verbal mediation (Paivio, 1971), it is also equivocal about 
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the relative value of verbal and imaginal generation. 
Dual coding theory does, however, allow predictions about 
the value of provided and generated information within a 
stimulus modality. 
If all imagery is just imagery, pictures of 
interacting objects and images of interactions between 
objects should be equally beneficial to memory. By the 
same reasoning, images of interactions should be equally 
helpful, whether evoked by a phrase relating two concrete 
nouns or by the verbal generation of this relationship. It 
is on these two comparisons that dual-coding predictions 
can be tested against an amodal alternative, predictions 
based on a generation advantage. (Neither model wins, as 
the reported study indicates, because the predictions of 
either can be confirmed or disconfirmed, depending on the 
combined effects of stimulus modality and orienting task.) 
Kieras (1978) criticized the dual-coding account of 
memory for verbal material in terms of differential 
imageability on the grounds that it fails to address the 
role of processes such as perception, comprehension, and 
the deliberate manipulation of images. He contended that 
Paivio's theory treats memory as the repository of raw 
sensory data—words and visual displays—rather than as the 
semantic system of concepts, properties, and relations that 
computer simulations indicate it must be. 
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Physiological evidence that image generation is not an 
exclusively right-hemispheric process (Kosslyn, Holtzman, 
Farah, & Gazzaniga, 1985) and that either hemisphere may be 
more active during the processing of either verbal or 
visual material, depending on whether the analysis is 
global or analytic (Gazzaniga & Hillyard, 1971; Ross & 
Turkewitz, 1982) provides further reason to discard a rigid 
distinction between verbal and nonverbal codes. 
Amodal Representation 
Opposing the idea of separate visual and verbal 
systems is the view that processing and representation are 
independent of the input mode. According to this view, 
information is stored in a propositional form that 
preserves its significant aspects but not necessarily the 
sensory code in which it arrived. Proponents of an amodal 
system consider comprehension a process that is both 
reductive and constructive. It involves extracting salient 
aspects of the input from the sensory particulars and 
elaborating the extracted information with knowledge 
acquired from similar input. The representations thus 
derived are less copies of reality than abstract relational 
meanings integrated in an organized system of meanings. 
The Problem with Amodal Representation 
Propositional models are more compatible than 
stimulus-bound models such as dual coding with evidence 
that memory is nonveridical and mutable. They are 
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particularly successful in explaining the associative and 
inferential processing of verbal input. However, a 
propositional account seems less applicable to the effects 
of nonverbal processing. Neither an advantage of pictures 
over words nor an advantage of an imaginal over a verbal 
processing strategy is an obvious consequence of an amodal 
system. In attempting to apply this system to these 
effects, its proponents have offered only differential 
elaboration as an alternative to dual coding (Anderson, 
1980; Anderson & Reder, 1979). Yet since even these 
proponents acknowledge that due to its irrelevant fan, 
elaboration may sometimes depress recall rather than 
enhance it (Anderson, 1983), and since no objective 
criterion has been proposed to predict the outcome of 
elaboration, the elaboration hypothesis has been even less 
testable than the dual coding hypothesis. Rated 
imageability has at least proved consistently predictive 
of recall (Paivio, 1971). 
Memory as Process 
Removing the Distinction Between 
Dual and Amodal Coding 
The mnemonic superiority of pictured objects to their 
labels and of imaginal to verbal strategies is customarily 
cited as evidence of the additive effects of separately 
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processed visual and verbal representations, whereas the 
superiority of internally generated to externally provided 
words has been considered more compatible with an amodal 
system. Because memory research tends to proceed within 
the confines of a particular theoretical camp, the findings 
emphasized by one researcher may seem of little relevance 
to another. Certain effects have therefore been 
compartmentalized by theory, and the investigation of 
possible correspondences among them is rare. 
Yet as Anderson (1978) has argued, none of the 
evidence offered in support of either dual coding theory or 
propositional models precludes the other view. It may be 
precisely in comparing the effects emphasized by seemingly 
opposing accounts—especially those effects that are not 
readily assimilable by the other—that cognitive psychology 
may discover significant truths about memory. 
Regardless of the validity of the criticisms leveled 
against dual coding as a representational model, to abandon 
the idea of complementary serial and analogue processing 
modes would be equivalent to rejecting the theory of 
natural selection on the grounds that it fails to specify 
the mechanisms of genetic transmission. The theory of dual 
coding was not developed to explain the transformation of 
verbal and visual codes into complex and interrelated 
meanings. Paivio proposed it in 1971 as an alternative to 
the then-prevalent view that thought is an exclusively 
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verbal, sequential process. Today, Paivio and others 
continue to address the issues raised by propositional 
theorists and to develop the dual-coding model (e.g., 
Paivio, 1986), which seems broad enough to accommodate new 
findings. Its merit is its attention to the powerful 
mnemonic effects of pictorial stimuli and imaginal 
processing—effects that the propositional models have so 
far neglected. 
Dual coding theory posits three stages of processing 
for meaning: representational, referential, and 
associative. According to Paivio (1971), beyond the 
representational stage of initial aodality-specific 
registration, at the referential and associative levels, 
verbally and visually acquired knowledge both contribute to 
the comprehension of stimuli presented in either mode. 
That is, mechanisms for modality-independent semantic 
processing are fundamental to the theory. 
As Marschark, Richman, Yuille, and Hunt (1987) have 
pointed out, separate forms of early processing do not 
necessitate separate long-term storage systems. Both 
visually and verbally received information may be retained 
in amodal configurations from which it may be redintegrated 
as either imagery or speech. By giving equal status to 
equivalent knowledge from differing sources, this 
resolution would allow dual coding theory to account for 
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the salutory effect of verbal as well as imaginal 
generation. 
Although the generation effect is usually discussed in 
a propositional framework, it is the hypothesized 
associative organization of such a system rather than its 
amodal nature that seems relevant to the effect. Although 
the generation effect can not be explained by reference to 
the advantage of dual representation, it is not 
inconsistent with dual perceptual modes that are separately 
specialized for analytic and global processing. It is 
clearly consistent with discrete processes of verbal and 
imaginal generation. 
The propositional view of representation in principle 
encompasses nonverbally acquired knowledge. In 
experimental practice, however, it has underemphasized the 
importance of such knowledge in human associative memory. 
Still, the inherent flexibility of an amodal system should 
allow it to improve its balance. Kosslyn has recommended 
that two types of proposition be admitted, one storing 
knowledge that is decodable into declarative sentences, the 
other representing spatial coordinates that are decodable 
into images (Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, & Wallach, 1984; 
Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Shwartz, 1979). This model would 
maintain the essential advantage of a propositional 
account, its suitability for computer simulation, while 
freeing it from its lexical bias. 
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The convergence account of memory effects advocated in 
this thesis does not require either a bimodal or an amodal 
model of representation. Either model could accommodate 
its propositions that visual detail and verbal context are 
equivalent in information value, that the usefulness of 
either provided or generated information depends on the 
precision of its relationship with a target response, and 
that image formation and verbal production are alternative 
means of expressing this relational processing. The 
principle of convergent elaboration does not specify the 
nature of representation because it pertains to the 
application of an inherently flexible semantic organization 
to variable memory requirements. In fact, by locating 
memory effects in processing rather than in stimulus 
differences, the principle of convergent elaboration may 
help to reconcile the two positions. 
The Process of Convergence 
A convergence account of the mnemonic value of 
elaborative processing is consistent with the view that 
concepts are not so much represented in a static 
associative network as defined at each instance by patterns 
of concurrent activation. In normal reality, every event 
occurs in a rich perceptual and situational context, the 
features of which contribute to the processing pattern by 
which the event is interpreted. Since reality seldom if 
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ever repeats itself, the pattern associated with any 
concept would vary with each instance. The processing of a 
given event would either converge on, or diverge from, any 
particular subset of associations. 
Unless the context of an event were exclusively and 
invariably associated with that event, the activation 
evoked would diverge somewhat from a prototypical pattern. 
It might involve some associations typical of a particular 
concept, but it would also involve associations typical of 
other concepts. The greater the distinctiveness, or mutual 
specificity, of the event and its context, the more likely 
that activation would converge on a prototypical conceptual 
pattern and the more likely the conscious accessing of this 
concept would become. In such a dynamic system, the 
probability that a cue from a prior encoding context would 
access a target pattern would depend on the extent to which 
the prior activation converged exclusively on this pattern. 
The consciousness of imagery, like consciousness 
itself, may be an epiphenomenal result of this automatic 
interpretive process. To the extent that the processing of 
input is continuous, consciousness is continuous and thus 
may seem to direct imaginal elaboration. However, to 
conceive of this elaboration, which is the ongoing 
modification of the contents of consciousness, as the 
result of an intention which is itself a part of the 
contents of consciousness is teleological. It is not 
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necessary to posit an inner eye or conscious computational 
system, the function of which is to extract meaning from a 
phenomenal display which has already been meaningfully 
assembled by nonconscious processes. 
The feeling of comprehension that accompanies 
attention to verbal input may result from the augmented 
activation produced by the convergence of the processing of 
incoming and of prior words, and the impression of imagery 
that accompanies the feeling of comprehension may be the 
perceptual aspect of this associative convergence. Thus 
the clarity of spontaneous imagery may directly indicate 
the extent to which the input is integrated with the 
representational system. That is, the image-evoking power, 
or concreteness, of a word may indicate the frequency with 
which it has been associated with particular physical 
features, and the concreteness of an extended description 
may indicate the frequency with which the perceptual 
features evoked by the words have been contextually 
associated. 
Elaborative convergence may be necessary for the 
integral representation of stimulus elements, but integral 
representation is not of itself sufficient for retrieval. 
In order to account for the process of accessing the 
original elements of a unified concept as well as for the 
prior process of unification, the convergence principle 
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must apply to the retrieval cue. The processing view of 
memory has a clear criterion for cue effectiveness: a cue 
will promote retrieval to the extent that it reinstates the 
original encoding process (Tulving and Thomson, 1973). 
In paired-associate learning, the paradigmatic case of 
relational elaboration, the cue is one of a pair of items 
associated during encoding. According, it should be 
particularly apt to reinstate the processing by which it 
was associated with the other item and thereby to access 
this item. Nevertheless, this cue is often ineffective— 
not necessarily because it failed to reinstate the encoding 
process but possibly because the encoding itself diverged 
from the relational concept. 
If context constrains activation, the activation 
evoked by a compound event, such as two objects linked by a 
verb or a preposition, would be more constrained than the 
activation evoked by simultaneously occurring but unrelated 
objects. Therefore the imagery experienced should be 
more conceptually associated or instantiated than for 
randomly paired words. In general, as verbal input was 
clarified through contextual information, activation, and 
therefore imagery, would become more constrained. The more 
constrained the activation during comprehension, the more 
likely it would be that reactivation of the original traces 
by a component of the original event would be experienced 
as remembering the event. 
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This account would explain the mnemonic effects 
considered in this proposal without imputing special powers 
to either imagery or generation. The picture superiority 
effect, the imagery effect, and the generation effect 
(including the effect of generated images) may all result 
from elaborative processing that promotes the convergence 
of processing on the to-be-tested concept. If the stimuli 
or task conditions compared did not affect convergence 
differentially, these effects would not occur. 
In the experiments reported in Chapter II, retrieval 
cues were effective when generation of the relationship was 
required, promoting the integration of cue and target. The 
cues were equally successful whether the generation task 
had been explicit (verbalizing or imaging a nonpresented 
relationship) or implicit (verbalizing a pictured 
relationship or imaging a stated relationship). Cue and 
target were less likely to be effectively integrated in the 
less generative conditions (verbalizing a stated 
relationship or imaging a pictured relationship). However, 
unless the relationship was a likely one, even generating 
it did not ensure the appropriate convergence of 
elaboration. 
In summary, no single form of elaboration is most 
conducive to retrieval. Convergent elaboration can be 
induced externally or internally and it can involve 
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spatial, temporal, or functional associations. A 
processing pattern that converges on one meaning will 
diverge from another, making some recall cues more 
effective than others in accessing a predefined target. 
Whether the external stimuli and the internal processing 
orientation together promote memory will depend on the 
specificity with which they constrain elaboration to the 
learning to be tested. 
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APPENDIX A 
Please rate the likelihood of each relationship, using the following scale: 
very 
unlikely ' ~r 
2 
r 
3 
r 
U 
i 
5 
T 
6 
very 
likely-
spoon in mitten 
ball on seal 
anchor on train 
flag on fsnce 
shovel in wheel 
saddle on peacock 
kitten on package 
thermos in vest 
necklace on purse 
vhale on chimney 
hen on ladder 
lamp on turtle 
web on branch 
bus on igloo 
fan on chair 
spider on guitar 
mop on sailboat 
tire in truck 
dog on bicycle 
wagon on stove 
eagle on propeller 
axe in drum 
whip in vase 
thermometer in tweezers 
cook on camel 
badge on gun 
goggles on broom 
ambulance on tracks 
fish in crib 
iron on lightbulb 
clown on banana 
baby in flowers 
scissors in waffle 
horseshoe on penguin 
squirrel en aink 
hatchet in belt 
jacket on fishhook 
bee on globe 
funnel on moose 
walrus in ring 
flask on horse 
windmill in snake 
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APPENDIX B 
Presentation Order with Likelihood Rating Means 
(7-point scale, n = 108) 
List 1 Ratina lr*st 2 Ratina 
1. whip in vase 1.5 shovel in wheel 1.6 
2. necklace on purse 3.0 bee an globe 3.1 
3. spoon in mitten 2.7 jacket on fishhok 2.6 
4. fish in crib 1.8 anchor on train 1.8 
5. thermos in vest 4.1 flag on fence 4.1 
6. whale on chimney 1.1 windmill in snake 1.1 
7. ambulance on tracks 2.7 cook on camel 2.7 
8. ball on seal 2.2 mop on sailboat 2.2 
9. tire in truck 6.3 web on branch 6.2 
10. lamp on turtle 1.3 iron on lightbulb 1.3 
11. spider on guitar 4.0 baby in flowers 3.6 
12. eagle on propeller 1.7 axe in drum 1.7 
13. goggles on broom 1.5 thermometer in tweezers 1.5 
14. dog on bicycle 2.1 badge on gun 2.2 
15. hatchet in belt 3.3 clown on banana 3.2 
16. bus on igloo 1.2 horseshoe on penguin 1.2 
17. saddle on peacock 1.4 funnel on moose 1.4 
CD
 
•
 
squirrel on sink 2.4 hen on ladder 2.6 
19. scissors in waffle 1.4 wagon on stove 1.3 
20. kitten on package 4.2 fan on chair 4.7 
Means 
(Likely, 3.8; Unlikely 
2.6 
, 1.5) (Likely, 3.8; Unlikely 
2.6 
, 1.5) 
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APPENDIX C 
hatchet -  belt  
h a t c h e t  i n  b e l t  
160 
161 
l a m p  -  t u r t l e  
l a m p  o n  t u r t l e  
162 
163 
baby -  f l o w e r s  
babu in flowers 
164 
165 
W a q o n  -  s t o v e  
waqon on stove 
166 
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APPENDIX D 
Instructions, Experiment 1: Relationship Provided 
(Word and Picture Stimuli, Respectively) 
The purpose of this study is to collect information 
about some stimulus items that will be used in a later 
experiment. We want to find out how easily these items can 
be described. 
A series of [three-word phrases / pictures] will 
appear on the video screen. Each [phrase relates the names 
of two objects with the word in or on / picture shows two 
objects, with one of them in or on the other]. 
Your task is to describe this relationship in one of 
these two sentences (INDICATE SIGN), substituting the 
[name / most common name] of each object for the X and Y. 
As soon as the [phrase / picture] disappears from the 
screen, I'd like you to say this sentence aloud. It is 
important that you say a sentence for every [phrase / 
picture]. Your responses will be recorded; just speak as 
loudly as you would to me. 
The [phrase / picture] will remain on the screen for 4 
seconds, and then the screen will be blank for 6 seconds. 
Two seconds before the next [phrase / picture] appears, a 
row of stars will appear on the screen. When the stars 
appear, you should be watching the screen. Do you have any 
questions? 
168 
I'll begin by showing you 4 practice [phrases / 
pictures], so that you can get a better idea of the 
procedure. Please [read each of these phrases / think of 
the most common name of each object] so that you can say 
the appropriate sentence when the [phrase / picture] 
disappears. Are you ready? 
(DIM LIGHTS; START VIDEO; 4 TRAINING TRIALS; STOP VIDEO) 
Do you feel comfortable with the task? ... 
During the rest of the procedure I'll leave you alone 
so that you can concentrate on the task. Just do your best 
to transform every [phrase / picture] into a sentence; then 
say the sentence aloud while the screen is blank. 
(START TAPE RECORDER; START VIDEO; LEAVE ROOM, TAKING 
REMOTE CONTROL SWITCH; 20 TRIALS ... STOP VIDEO & RETURN) 
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Instructions, Experiment 1: Relationship Generated 
(Word and Picture Stimuli, Respectively) 
The purpose of this study is to collect information 
about some stimulus items that will be used in a later 
experiment. We want to find out what kind of relationship 
people prefer between different kinds of objects. 
A series of pairs of [words / pictures] will appear on 
the video screen. Each pair [names / shows] two objects. 
Your task is to decide which of these two sentences 
(INDICATE SIGN) could better express a relationship between 
these objects, substituting the [name / most common name] 
of each object for the X and Y. The sentence would 
describe the object [named / shown] on the left of the 
screen as either in or on the one [named / shown] on the 
right. The relationship you choose could be an ordinary 
one or it could be a very unlikely one, but you should have 
a reason for choosing it. So try to choose the more 
appropriate sentence - the one that relates the object on 
the left to the one on the right in a more meaningful way. 
(EXAMPLE, WORDS OR PICTURES RUG & BUG ON BOARD: "The rug is 
on/in the bug.") 
As soon as the [words / pictures] disappear from the 
screen, I'd like you to say the sentence that you prefer 
aloud. It is important that you say a sentence for every 
pair of [words / pictures]. Your responses will be 
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recorded; just speak as loudly as you would to me. 
The [words / pictures] will remain on the screen for 4 
seconds, and then the screen will be blank for 6 seconds. 
Two seconds before the next pair of objects are [named / 
shown], a row of stars will appear on the screen. 
When the stars appear, you should be watching the screen. 
Do you have any questions? 
I'll begin by showing you 4 practice pairs, so that 
you can get a better idea of the procedure. Please decide 
whether the object on the left should be in or on the one 
on the right, so that you can say the appropriate sentence 
when the [words / pictures] disappear. Are you ready? 
(DIM LIGHTS? START VIDEO; 4 TRAINING TRIALS; STOP VIDEO) 
Do you feel comfortable with the task? ... 
During the rest of the procedure I'll leave you alone 
so that you can concentrate on the task. Just do your best 
to choose the most appropriate sentence for every pair of 
[words / pictures]; then say the sentence aloud while the 
screen is blank. 
(START TAPE RECORDER; START VIDEO; LEAVE ROOM, TAKING 
REMOTE CONTROL SWITCH; 20 TRIALS ... STOP VIDEO & RETURN) 
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Instructions, Experiment 2: Relationship Provided 
(Word and Picture Stimuli, Respectively) 
The purpose of this study is to collect information 
about some stimulus items that will be used in a later 
experiment. We want to find out how easily these items can 
be visualized. 
A series of [three-word phrases / pictures] will 
appear on the video screen. Each [phrase relates the names 
of two objects with the word in or on / picture shows two 
objects, with one of them in or on the other]. 
Your task is to [form a visual image of this 
relationship / keep the image of this relationship in mind 
for a short time when it is no longer visible on the 
screen]. Notice that your answer sheet has a series of 
rating scales, each numbered from 1 to 5. For every 
[phrase / picture], I'd like you to circle a number to rate 
the vividness of [your image / the image you are holding 
when you look away from the screen]—that is, how vividly 
you visualize the relationship [described by the phrase / 
pictured. If the image you [experienced / retained] were 
very vague, you would circle 1. If it were very vivid, you 
would circle 5, and for intermediate degrees of vividness, 
you would circle 2, 3, or 4. It is important that you 
visualize every relationship. 
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The [phrase / picture] will remain on the screen for 4 
seconds, and then the screen will be blank for 6 seconds. 
Two seconds before the next [phrase / picture] appears, a 
row of stars will appear on the screen. When the stars 
appear, you should be watching the screen. Are there any 
questions? 
I'll begin by showing you 4 practice [phrases / 
pictures], so that you can get a better idea of the 
procedure. Please [form a / retain the] visual image of 
each picture so that you can rate this image. Use the four 
practice rating scales at the top of the page. Are you 
ready? 
(DIM LIGHTS; START VIDEO; 4 TRAINING TRIALS; STOP VIDEO) 
Does everyone feel comfortable with the task? ... 
During the rest of the procedure I'd like you not to 
communicate with each other and to be as silent as 
possible. Just do your best to [form an / hold the] image 
of every relationship and to rate every image honestly. 
You'll start with rating scale number 1 and work down the 
page. Here we go. 
(START VIDEO; 20 TRIALS ... STOP VIDEO) 
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Instructions, Experiment 2: Relationship Generated 
(Word and Picture Stimuli, Respectively) 
The purpose of this study is to collect information 
about some stimulus items that will be used in a later 
experiment. We want to find out how easily these items can 
be visualized in relation to each other. 
A series of pairs of [words / pictures] will appear on 
the video screen. Each pair [names / shows] two objects. 
Your task is to form a visual image that relates these 
objects so that the one [named / shown] on the left of the 
screen in in or on the one [named / shown] on the right. 
The relationship you visualize could be an ordinary one or 
it could be a very unlikely one, but you should form as 
vivid an image as possible of the object on the left either 
in or on the one on the right. 
(EXAMPLE, WORDS OR PICTURES RUG & BUG ON BOARD: "Visualize 
a rug on/in a bug.") 
Notice that your answer sheet has a series of rating 
scales, each numbered from 1 to 5. For every pair of 
objects, I'd like you to circle a number to rate the 
vividness of your image—that is, how vividly you visualize 
the relationship between the objects. If the image you 
experienced were very vague, you would circle 1. If it 
were very vivid, you would circle 5, and for intermediate 
degrees of vividness, you would circle 2, 3, or 4. It is 
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important that you visualize a relationship between every 
pair of objects. 
The [words / pictures] will remain on the screen for 4 
seconds, and then the screen will be blank for 6 seconds. 
Two seconds before the next pair of objects are [named / 
shown], a row of stars will appear on the screen. When the 
stars appear, you should be watching the screen. Are there 
any questions? 
I'll begin by showing you 4 practice pairs, so that 
you can get a better idea of the procedure. Please form a 
visual image of each pair of objects, with the one on the 
left in or on the one on the right, so that you can rate 
this image. Use the four practice rating scales at the top 
of the page. Are you ready? 
(DIM LIGHTS; START VIDEO; 4 TRAINING TRIALS; STOP VIDEO) 
Does everyone feel comfortable with the task? ... 
During the rest of the procedure I'd like you not to 
communicate with each other and to be as silent as 
possible. Just do your best to form an image relating 
every pair of [words / pictures] and to rate every image 
honestly. You'll start with rating scale number 1 and work 
down the page. Here we go. 
(START VIDEO; 20 TRIALS ... STOP VIDEO) 
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Instructions, Experiment 3: Imaginal Generation 
(Word and Picture Stimuli, Respectively) 
The purpose of this study is to collect information 
about some stimulus items that will be used in a later 
experiment. We want to find out how easily these items can 
be visualized in relation to each other. 
A series of pairs of [words / pictures] will appear on 
the video screen. Each pair [names / shows] two objects. 
Your task is to form a visual image that relates these 
objects so that the one [named / shown] on the left of the 
screen in on the one [named / shown] on the right. The 
relationship you visualize could be an ordinary one or it 
could be a very unlikely one, but you should form as vivid 
an image as possible of the object on the left on top of 
the one on the right. 
(EXAMPLE, WORDS OR PICTURES RUG & BUG ON BOARD: "Visualize 
a rug on a bug.") 
Notice that your answer sheet has a series of rating 
scales, each numbered from 1 to 5. For every pair of 
objects, I'd like you to circle a number to rate the 
vividness of your image—that is, how vividly you visualize 
the relationship between the objects. If the image you 
experienced were very vague, you would circle 1. If it 
were very vivid, you would circle 5, and for intermediate 
degrees of vividness, you would circle 2, 3, or 4. It is 
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important that you visualize the relationship between every 
pair of objects. 
The [words / pictures] will remain on the screen for 4 
seconds, and then the screen will be blank for 6 seconds. 
Two seconds before the next pair of objects are [named / 
shown], a row of stars will appear on the screen. When the 
/ 
stars appear, you should be watching the screen. Are there 
any questions? 
I'll begin by showing you 4 practice pairs, so that 
you can get a better idea of the procedure. Please form a 
visual image of each pair of objects, with the one on the 
left on the one on the right, so that you can rate this 
image. Use the four practice rating scales at the top of 
the page. Are you ready? 
(DIM LIGHTS; START VIDEO? 4 TRAINING TRIALS; STOP VIDEO) 
Does everyone feel comfortable with the task? ... 
During the rest of the procedure I'd like you not to 
communicate with each other and to be as silent as 
possible. Just do your best to form an image relating 
every pair of [words / pictures] and to rate every image 
honestly. You'll start with rating scale number 1 and work 
down the page. Here we go. 
(START VIDEO; 20 TRIALS ... STOP VIDEO) 
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Instructions, Experiment 3: Verbal Generation 
(Word and Picture Stimuli, Respectively) 
The purpose of this study is to collect information 
about some stimulus items that will be used in a later 
experiment. We want to find out how likely certain kinds 
of statements are, in your judgment. 
A series of pairs of [words / pictures] will appear on 
the video screen. Each pair [names / shows] two objects. 
Your task is to think of a sentence that describes the 
object [named / shown] on the left of the screen as on the 
one [named / shown] on the right. The sentence should take 
the form "The X is on the Y, substituting the [name / most 
common name] of each object for the X and Y. 
(EXAMPLE, WORDS OR PICTURES RUG & BUG ON BOARD: You would 
mentally construct the sentence "The rug is on the bug.") 
Notice that your answer sheet has a series of rating 
scales, each numbered from 1 to 5. For every sentence you 
construct, I'd like you to circle a number to rate its 
likelihood—that is, how likely this particular sentence is 
to occur in speech or in print. If the sentence were very 
unlikely, you would circle 1. If it were very likely, you 
would circle 5, and for intermediate degrees of likelihood, 
you would circle 2, 3, or 4. You should not say the 
sentence aloud, but it is important that you keep the 
complete sentence in mind as you do the rating. 
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The [words / pictures] will remain on the screen for 4 
seconds, and then the screen will be blank for 6 seconds. 
Two seconds before the next pair of objects are [named / 
shown], a row of stars will appear on the screen. When the 
stars appear, you should be watching the screen. Are there 
any questions? 
I'll begin by showing you 4 practice pairs, so that 
you can get a better idea of the procedure. Please insert 
the names of each pair of objects in a sentence of the form 
"The X is on the Y, with the one on the left on the one on 
the right, so that you can rate this sentence. Use the 
four practice rating scales at the top of the page. Are 
you ready? 
(DIM LIGHTS; START VIDEO; 4 TRAINING TRIALS; STOP VIDEO) 
Does everyone feel comfortable with the task? ... 
During the rest of the procedure I'd like you not to 
communicate with each other and to be as silent as 
possible. Just do your best to construct a complete 
sentence of the proper form for every pair of [words / 
pictures] and to rate every sentence honestly. You'll start 
with rating scale number 1 and work down the page. Here we 
go. 
(START VIDEO; 20 TRIALS ... STOP VIDEO) 
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APPENDIX E 
Name 
Practice Trials 
yvery vague 
PI. 1 2 3 4 5 
vw^xjr yxviu; \very vagu« 
P3. 1 2 3 4 5 
(very vague) (very vivid) (very vasue) 
P2. 1 2 3 4 5 P4. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. 1 2 3 4 5 16. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. 1 2 3 4 5 17. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. 1 2 3 4 5 • 
to H
 1 2 3 4 5 
4. 1 2 3 4 5 19. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. 1 2 3 4 5 20. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. 1 2 3 4 5 21. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. 1 2 3 4 5 22. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. 1 2 3 4 5 23. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. 1 2 3 . 5 24. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. 1 2 3 4 5 25. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. 1 2 3 4 5 26. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. 1 2 3 4 5 27. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. 1 2 3 4 5 28. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. 1 2 3 4 5 29. 1 2 3 4 5 
(very vivid) 
(very vivid) 
15. 1 2 3 4 5 30. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Name _________________________ 
Practice Trials 
(unlikely) (likely) (unlikely) ____________ (likely) 
PI. 1 2 3 4 5 P3. 1 2 3 4 5 
(unlikely) (likely) (unlikely) (likely) 
P2. 1 2 3 4 5 P4. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. 1 2 3 4 5 16. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. 1 2 3 4 5 17. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. 1 2 3 4 5 18. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. 1 2 3 4 5 19. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. 1 2 3 4 5 20. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. 1 2 3 4 5 21. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. 1 2 3 4 5 22. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. 1 2 3 4 5 23. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. 1 2 3 4 5 24. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. 1 2 3 4 5 25. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. 1 2 3 4 5 26. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. 1 2 3 4 5 27. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. 1 2 3 4 5 28. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. 1 2 3 4 5 29. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. 1 2 3 4 5 30. 1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX F 
Strategy Report Instructions 
Sometimes the particular stimulus materials used in a 
study have a strong effect on people's ability to follow 
instructions. Some stimuli make following instructions 
easy, while other stimuli make it almost impossible. The 
purpose of this study is to test the compatibility of 
various instructions and stimuli. The task you've just 
completed is just one of eight different combinations of 
stimuli and instructions. People in the other seven 
conditions might see a different kind of stimulus material 
than you saw, or they might be asked to think about the 
material differently. You've been doing your best to 
follow instructions. However, the form your thinking 
actually took as you did the task may have depended on 
factors beyond your control. Some thinking seems to be 
primarily verbal, other thinking seems to be primarily 
visual, and some thinking seems to be more abstract, in 
that it doesn't involve either specific words or specific 
images. None of these forms of thinking is better or more 
efficient than another. I'd like to know the kind of 
thinking that actually occurred as you performed the task 
you've just completed. Before you write anything on the 
sheet I'm going to give you, I'd like you to read all eight 
of the statements on it very carefully. Then decide which 
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statement or statements most accurately describes these 
thought processes. Then I'd like you to put a number on 
the line before each statement to indicate the percentage 
of the time this form of thinking occurred. The sum of the 
numbers will be 100%. For example, if you had the same 
sort of thoughts consistently, you'd put 100 on the line in 
front of the appropriate statement and 0 in front of the 
other seven statements. Or you might have thought about 
the material in two ways in a 50-50 ratio, or maybe a 75-25 
ratio, and so forth. Just do your best to report the type 
of thinking that actually occurred, whatever it was. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Do you have any questions? 
Please take as much time as you need to report your 
thought processes accurately. (5 MIN.) Could you use more 
time? ... (2 MIN) Would you please check that the 
percentages you put down total 100, and that your name is 
on the sheet. (COLLECT; DISTRIBUTE CUED-RECALL FORMS) 
RECALL INSTRUCTIONS: Name on sheet; circle M or F to 
indicate sex; guess if uncertain; put down an answer for 
every item. (5 MIN) Could you use more time? ... (2 MIN; 
COLLECT; DISTRIBUTE RECOGNITION FORMS) 
RECOGNITION INSTRUCTIONS: Name on sheet; check 20 items 
from initial presentation. (5-7 MIN) Count checkmarks to 
make sure there are exactly 20. (COLLECT) 
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Name 
First, recall the sort of thinking you were doing when you were 
considering the two objects in each trial of the previous task. 
Next, read all £ of the statements below and decide which of 
them most accurately describes your approach to the task. 
Then put a number from 0 to 100 before each statement to 
indicate the percentage of the time you used this strategy. 
(The sum of these percentages should be 100£.) 
!• ______ I visualized each of the two objects. 
2. ______ I visualized the interaction between the objects. 
3. _____ I thought of the names of the two objects. 
U, _____ 1 thought of words describing the interaction. 
5. _____ I visualized, and thought of the names of, each of the 
two objects 
6. I visualized the interaction between the objects and 
thought of words describing it. 
7. I thought about each of the two objects without 
visualizing them or thinking of their names. 
8 I thought about the interaction between the objects 
without visualizing it or thinking of words 
describing it. 
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APPENDIX 6 
Name ________________________________ H F (Circle one) 
Please supply the other member of the pair of objects that was presented. 
whale — squirrel 
bus "" - spoon 
lamp i •— ambulance 
sciaaora ' necklace 
saddle . . . ' hatchet 
gogglea • spider 
whip . thermos 
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Name M F (Circle one) 
Please supply the naae of the other object that was presented vlth 
each object pictured. 
D 
187 
Naiw M F (Circle one) 
Please supply the other ncaber of the pair of objects that was presented, 
windnlll -—— ^ion ' 
horseshoe ___________________ Jacket —————— 
iron cook 
wagon ba# 
funnel __________________ clown „ 
thermometer ______________ baby _ 
shovel ________________ 
ajC9 £ OR MMMRMMMMMMMH 
anchor M0P 
badge ________________ w*k ' 
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Na*e M F (Circle one) 
Please supply the nane of the other object that was presented with 
each object plcture'd. 
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APPENDIX H 
Name ____________________________________________ 
Among the objects named below are 20 that were paired with another object 
during the first task. Please put a check before these 20. items only. 
goblet _ l i g h t b u l b  
airplane ___ cupboard 
package typewriter 
chair wheel 
piano swing 
purse turtle 
globe vase 
target pad&L# 
truck cookie 
branch cr*b 
comb • train 
motor ___ chimney 
chart canoe 
mitten . harp 
fishhook . snake 
ostrich — b u c k e t  
guitar _ p e a c o c k  
flowers giraffe 
stairs — l°g 
scarf moose 
suitcase ___ vest 
propeller frog 
otter book 
drum fence 
cage ^_ tracks 
porch ___ camel 
mouse __ iceberg 
waffle ____ hat 
stove __ seal 
bear sailboat 
bicycle __ clock 
gun — goat 
igloo 
scale ladder 
penguin ____ battery 
thumbtack __ shoe 
broom pie 
tweezers be.lt 
pipe ___ banana 
tank tree 
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APPENDIX I 
THINKING ABOUT THINGS 
You have participated in an experiment in cognitive 
psychology, an area concerned with the way people organize 
and use their knowledge. The study explores the 
effectiveness of particular ways of thinking for organizing 
and using particular kinds of knowledge. For example, we 
know that it's easier to think about an object shown in a 
picture if we've just seen the picture. But would seeing 
the picture help us to think about the object in a way that 
the picture did not show? 
You were asked to think about pairs of objects in a 
particular way—by forming either sentences or visual 
images. You may have seen pictures of these objects or you 
may have seen their names, and the objects may have been 
presented either separately or in interaction. We want to 
know how these three independent variables—task, stimulus 
mode, and relationship presented—affected your ability to 
think about the objects in the way you were asked to do. 
We assume that this ability is reflected in your responses, 
relative to people in the other conditions, on our 
dependent variables—the "thought processes" report and the 
recall and recognition tasks. 
A better understanding of the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of various strategies for organizing and 
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using particular kinds of knowledge would have practical 
importance for all of us. As members of an information-
intensive society, we and our children would benefit from 
the application of techniques that improved our ability to 
acquire, to organize, and to communicate our knowledge more 
effectively. 
